GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect
defimported Lean
A strategy is subgame-perfect (SPE) if, at every subtree, no player can strictly improve their payoff by a unilateral deviation — i.e., by switching to any i-variant strategy.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GameTree in variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in def GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect (σ : Strategy N U) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect← GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect (EconCSLib/GameTheory/ExtensiveGame/GameTreeSPE.lean:129): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 12
- GameTree.outcome_LeafGameTree.outcome_Leaf
- GameTree.outcome_NodeGameTree.outcome_Node
- GameTree.IVariantTwo strategies are
i-variants if they agree on all nodes NOT owned byi. I.e.,σ'is obtained fromσby changing only playeri's… - GameTree.outcomeThe outcome (terminal payoff vector) of playing strategy
σstarting from game treeg. Walks down the tree, usingσto pick a child… - TotalPreorderA total preorder: a preorder where
≤is total (complete). This is weaker thanLinearOrder— it does NOT require antisymmetry or… - GameTree.StrategyA pure strategy for the entire game tree: at every possible node context
(mover, head, tail), specify one child (bundled with its… - GameTreeA finite extensive-form game of perfect information, without chance. *
Leaf payoff— a terminal state with a payoff vectorN → U. *… - GameTree.childrenThe full child list at a
Node, as a guaranteed non-empty list. - GameTree.value_LeafGameTree.value_Leaf
- GameTree.value_NodeGameTree.value_Node
- GameTree.valueList_nilGameTree.valueList_nil
- GameTree.valueList_consGameTree.valueList_cons
- Used by 6
- GameTree.Kuhn_exists_SPE_onKuhn's theorem, root-scoped SPE form: every finite perfect-information game without chance has a pure strategy that is subgame-perfect…
- GameTree.Kuhn_exists_NEKuhn's theorem, NE form: every finite perfect-information game without chance has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
- GameTree.optStrategy_isSubgamePerfectOptimality of
optStrategy: for every subtreeg, every playeri, and everyi-variant deviationσ', the deviating outcome is… - GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toSubgamePerfectOnA global subgame-perfect equilibrium is subgame-perfect on every fixed root.
- GameTree.Kuhn_exists_SPEKuhn's theorem (existence form): every finite perfect-information game without chance admits a subgame-perfect equilibrium. The…
- GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toNESPE ⇒ NE: every subgame-perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium (at any fixed root game).
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GameTree in variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in /-- A strategy is **subgame-perfect** (SPE) if, at every subtree, no player can strictly improve their payoff by a unilateral deviation — i.e., by switching to any `i`-variant strategy. -/ def GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect (σ : Strategy N U) : Prop := ∀ (g : GameTree N U) (i : N) (σ' : Strategy N U), IVariant i σ σ' → outcome σ' g i ≤ outcome σ g i