GameTree.Kuhn_exists_NE
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Kuhn's theorem, NE form: every finite perfect-information game without chance has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GameTree in variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in theorem GameTree.Kuhn_exists_NE [DecidableLE U] (g : GameTree N U) : ∃ σ : Strategy N U, GameTree.IsNashEquilibrium σ g
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `GameTree.Kuhn_exists_NE`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GameTree.Kuhn_exists_NE← GameTree.Kuhn_exists_NE (EconCSLib/GameTheory/ExtensiveGame/GameTreeNE.lean:110): adapted
What was changed in
GameTree.Kuhn_exists_NE--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/ExtensiveGame/GameTreeNE.lean:110 (GameTree.Kuhn_exists_NE) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ -/-- **Kuhn's theorem, NE form**: every finite perfect-information game - without chance has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. -/ -theorem Kuhn_exists_NE [DecidableLE U] (g : GameTree N U) : - ∃ σ : Strategy N U, IsNashEquilibrium σ g := by +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +open GameTree in +variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in +theorem GameTree.Kuhn_exists_NE [DecidableLE U] (g : GameTree N U) : + ∃ σ : Strategy N U, GameTree.IsNashEquilibrium σ g := by obtain ⟨σ, hspe⟩ := Kuhn_exists_SPE (N := N) (U := U) - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 14
- GameTree.outcome_LeafGameTree.outcome_Leaf
- GameTree.outcome_NodeGameTree.outcome_Node
- GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectA strategy is subgame-perfect (SPE) if, at every subtree, no player can strictly improve their payoff by a unilateral deviation —…
- GameTree.IsNashEquilibriumNash equilibrium: no single player can improve their outcome at the root game by unilateral deviation. Weaker than
IsSubgamePerfect,… - GameTree.Kuhn_exists_SPEKuhn's theorem (existence form): every finite perfect-information game without chance admits a subgame-perfect equilibrium. The…
- GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toNESPE ⇒ NE: every subgame-perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium (at any fixed root game).
- TotalPreorderA total preorder: a preorder where
≤is total (complete). This is weaker thanLinearOrder— it does NOT require antisymmetry or… - GameTreeA finite extensive-form game of perfect information, without chance. *
Leaf payoff— a terminal state with a payoff vectorN → U. *… - GameTree.StrategyA pure strategy for the entire game tree: at every possible node context
(mover, head, tail), specify one child (bundled with its… - GameTree.childrenThe full child list at a
Node, as a guaranteed non-empty list. - GameTree.value_LeafGameTree.value_Leaf
- GameTree.value_NodeGameTree.value_Node
- GameTree.valueList_nilGameTree.valueList_nil
- GameTree.valueList_consGameTree.valueList_cons
- Used by 1
- GameTree.zermelo_exists_pure_NEPure root Nash existence for a finite two-player game on
ℚ: theFin 2/ℚinstance ofKuhn_exists_NE. Zero-sum is not needed.
- GameTree.zermelo_exists_pure_NEPure root Nash existence for a finite two-player game on
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen GameTree invariable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in/-- **Kuhn's theorem, NE form**: every finite perfect-information game without chance has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. -/theorem GameTree.Kuhn_exists_NE [DecidableLE U] (g : GameTree N U) : ∃ σ : Strategy N U, GameTree.IsNashEquilibrium σ g := by obtain ⟨σ, hspe⟩ := Kuhn_exists_SPE (N := N) (U := U) exact ⟨σ, hspe.toNE g⟩