GameTree.optStrategy_isSubgamePerfect
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Optimality of optStrategy: for every subtree g, every player i, and every i-variant deviation σ', the deviating outcome is no better than optStrategy's outcome at coordinate i. This is the SPE property spelled out before bundling into existence form.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GameTree in variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in theorem GameTree.optStrategy_isSubgamePerfect [DecidableLE U] : IsSubgamePerfect (optStrategy : Strategy N U)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `GameTree.optStrategy_isSubgamePerfect`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GameTree.optStrategy_isSubgamePerfect← GameTree.optStrategy_isSubgamePerfect (EconCSLib/GameTheory/ExtensiveGame/GameTreeSPE.lean:157): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 19
- GameTree.outcome_LeafGameTree.outcome_Leaf
- GameTree.outcome_NodeGameTree.outcome_Node
- GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectA strategy is subgame-perfect (SPE) if, at every subtree, no player can strictly improve their payoff by a unilateral deviation —…
- GameTree.outcome_optStrategy_eq_valueKey lemma: the outcome of the backward-induction strategy equals the backward-induction value vector at every game tree. This is the…
- GameTree.IVariantTwo strategies are
i-variants if they agree on all nodes NOT owned byi. I.e.,σ'is obtained fromσby changing only playeri's… - GameTree.strong_inductionStrong induction: to prove
motive g, it suffices to handleLeafand, for eachNode, to prove the motive given the motive for… - GameTree.optStrategyThe canonical backward-induction strategy: at each node, pick a child whose backward-induction value equals the node's value (i.e., a…
- GameTree.outcomeThe outcome (terminal payoff vector) of playing strategy
σstarting from game treeg. Walks down the tree, usingσto pick a child… - GameTree.value_optStrategy_eqAt a node, the
optStrategypicks a child whose value equals the node's value. - TotalPreorderA total preorder: a preorder where
≤is total (complete). This is weaker thanLinearOrder— it does NOT require antisymmetry or… - GameTreeA finite extensive-form game of perfect information, without chance. *
Leaf payoff— a terminal state with a payoff vectorN → U. *… - GameTree.StrategyA pure strategy for the entire game tree: at every possible node context
(mover, head, tail), specify one child (bundled with its… - GameTree.valueGameTree.value
- GameTree.value_Node_geKey optimality lemma: at a
Node m h t, the moverm's coordinate of the backward-induction value dominates every child's. - GameTree.childrenThe full child list at a
Node, as a guaranteed non-empty list. - GameTree.value_LeafGameTree.value_Leaf
- GameTree.value_NodeGameTree.value_Node
- GameTree.valueList_nilGameTree.valueList_nil
- GameTree.valueList_consGameTree.valueList_cons
- Used by 3
- GameTree.outcome_le_value₀_of_iVariant_zeroPlayer 1's security. If player 1 plays
optStrategy(soσ'is a0-variant, leaving player 1's choices fixed), then player 0's… - GameTree.value₀_le_outcome_of_iVariant_onePlayer 0's security. If player 0 plays
optStrategy(so the deviating profileσ'is a1-variant, leaving player 0's choices… - GameTree.Kuhn_exists_SPEKuhn's theorem (existence form): every finite perfect-information game without chance admits a subgame-perfect equilibrium. The…
- GameTree.outcome_le_value₀_of_iVariant_zeroPlayer 1's security. If player 1 plays
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen GameTree invariable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in/-- **Optimality of `optStrategy`**: for every subtree `g`, every player `i`, and every `i`-variant deviation `σ'`, the deviating outcome is no better than `optStrategy`'s outcome at coordinate `i`. This is the SPE property spelled out before bundling into existence form. -/theorem GameTree.optStrategy_isSubgamePerfect [DecidableLE U] : IsSubgamePerfect (optStrategy : Strategy N U) := by intro g i σ' hiv induction g using GameTree.strong_induction with | base p => -- Both outcomes equal `p`; `≤` holds by reflexivity. simp [outcome_Leaf] | step m h t ih => -- Two subcases depending on whether the mover is the deviating player. rw [outcome_Node, outcome_Node] by_cases hmi : m = i · -- Mover = deviating player. σ' can pick any child c'; optStrategy picks argmax. -- Use IH on c' to compare σ' vs optStrategy there, then value_Node_ge. have hmem' : (σ' m h t).val ∈ h :: t := (σ' m h t).property -- IH on c' gives: outcome σ' c' i ≤ outcome optStrategy c' i have h_ih := ih _ hmem' -- Bridge: outcome optStrategy c' = value c' rw [outcome_optStrategy_eq_value] at h_ih -- value c' i ≤ value (Node m h t) i by value_Node_ge have h_max : (value (σ' m h t).val) i ≤ (value (Node m h t)) i := by subst hmi exact value_Node_ge m h t _ hmem' -- Right side: outcome optStrategy (optStrategy m h t).val i = value (Node m h t) i have h_rhs : outcome optStrategy (optStrategy m h t).val i = (value (Node m h t)) i := by rw [outcome_optStrategy_eq_value] exact congrArg (· i) (value_optStrategy_eq m h t) calc outcome σ' (σ' m h t).val i ≤ (value (σ' m h t).val) i := h_ih _ ≤ (value (Node m h t)) i := h_max _ = outcome optStrategy (optStrategy m h t).val i := h_rhs.symm · -- Mover ≠ deviating player: σ' and optStrategy pick the same child. have hsame : σ' m h t = optStrategy m h t := (hiv m h t hmi).symm rw [hsame] -- Apply IH on the shared child have hmem : (optStrategy m h t).val ∈ h :: t := (optStrategy m h t).property exact ih _ hmem