IsBestResponse.congr_payoff
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
T1: Best response depends only on player i's payoff column.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in theorem IsBestResponse.congr_payoff (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) (σ : G.Profile) (i : N) {payoff' : G.Profile → N → U} (h : ∀ τ : G.Profile, payoff' τ i = G.payoff τ i) : IsBestResponse G σ i ↔ IsBestResponse { G with payoff := payoff' } σ i
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `IsBestResponse.congr_payoff`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.IsBestResponse.congr_payoff← IsBestResponse.congr_payoff (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/BestResponse.lean:30): adapted
What was changed in
IsBestResponse.congr_payoff--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/BestResponse.lean:30 (IsBestResponse.congr_payoff) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,3 +1,6 @@ -/-- T1: Best response depends only on player `i`'s payoff column. -/ -theorem congr_payoff (G : StrategicGame N U) (σ : G.Profile) (i : N) +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in +open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in +theorem IsBestResponse.congr_payoff (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) (σ : G.Profile) (i : N) {payoff' : G.Profile → N → U} - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Quot.soundpropext- Built on 7
- IsBestResponsePlayer
iis playing a best response to profileσin gameGif no unilateral deviation to any strategys'yields a higher payoff. - EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
G: each player picks a strategy. This is a dependent function∀ i, G.strategy i. The profile… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateUnilateral deviation in a game-bound profile: player
iswitches tos', while all other players keep their current strategies. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- IsBestResponsePlayer
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] inopen EconCSLib.StrategicGame in/-- T1: Best response depends only on player `i`'s payoff column. -/theorem IsBestResponse.congr_payoff (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) (σ : G.Profile) (i : N) {payoff' : G.Profile → N → U} (h : ∀ τ : G.Profile, payoff' τ i = G.payoff τ i) : IsBestResponse G σ i ↔ IsBestResponse { G with payoff := payoff' } σ i := by simp [IsBestResponse, h]