AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

IsBestResponse.congr_payoff

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

T1: Best response depends only on player i's payoff column.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in
open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in
theorem IsBestResponse.congr_payoff (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) (σ : G.Profile) (i : N)
    {payoff' : G.Profile → N → U}
    (h : ∀ τ : G.Profile, payoff' τ i = G.payoff τ i) :
    IsBestResponse G σ i ↔
    IsBestResponse { G with payoff := payoff' } σ i
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `IsBestResponse.congr_payoff`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
What was changed in IsBestResponse.congr_payoff
--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/BestResponse.lean:30 (IsBestResponse.congr_payoff)
+++ as compiled here
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
-/-- T1: Best response depends only on player `i`'s payoff column. -/
-theorem congr_payoff (G : StrategicGame N U) (σ : G.Profile) (i : N)
+set_option autoImplicit true in
+set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
+variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in
+open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in
+theorem IsBestResponse.congr_payoff (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) (σ : G.Profile) (i : N)
     {payoff' : G.Profile → N → U}
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Quot.soundpropext
Built on 7

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] inopen EconCSLib.StrategicGame in/-- T1: Best response depends only on player `i`'s payoff column. -/theorem IsBestResponse.congr_payoff (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) (σ : G.Profile) (i : N)    {payoff' : G.Profile → N → U}    (h : ∀ τ : G.Profile, payoff' τ i = G.payoff τ i) :    IsBestResponse G σ i ↔    IsBestResponse { G with payoff := payoff' } σ i := by  simp [IsBestResponse, h]
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