MatrixGame.mem_optimalColumnStrategies_iff_E_le
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
A column strategy is optimal iff against every mixed row it caps payoff at the value.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MatrixGame in open Finset BigOperators in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in universe u in variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in theorem MatrixGame.mem_optimalColumnStrategies_iff_E_le (yy : stdSimplex ℝ J) : yy ∈ A.optimalColumnStrategies ↔ ∀ x' : stdSimplex ℝ I, A.E x' yy ≤ A.value
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.mem_optimalColumnStrategies_iff_E_le`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MatrixGame.mem_optimalColumnStrategies_iff_E_le← MatrixGame.mem_optimalColumnStrategies_iff_E_le (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/MatrixGameNash.lean:200): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 16
- MatrixGame.value_eq_minimaxMatrixGame.value_eq_minimax
- MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
i : I, Player II chooses columnj : J. Payoff to Player I isg i j… - MatrixGame.optimalColumnStrategiesThe set of optimal column strategies: mixed strategies that achieve the minimax value.
- MatrixGame.EExpected payoff when Player I uses mixed strategy
xand Player II usesy. - MatrixGame.valueThe value of a matrix game (
sSup-based; needs order completeness). Equal to both maximin and minimax by the minimax theorem… - MatrixGame.guarantee_IIPlayer II's guaranteed loss using mixed strategy
y: the maximum expected payoff (for Player I) over all of Player I's pure responses. - MatrixGame.EiExpected payoff when pure row
ifaces Player II's mixed strategyy. - wsumWeighted sum of
fwith weights from a simplex elementx. Thinabbrevover Mathlib's finite dot product⬝ᵥ: definitionally equal,… - le_iff_simplex_le
f ≤ vpointwise iff every simplex weighted sum is≤ v. - stdSimplex.purePoint-mass simplex element at
i₀. - wsum_pure_applyWeighted sum at a point mass evaluates the chosen coordinate.
- MatrixGame.minimaxThe minimax value: the best guarantee Player II can achieve.
minimax = inf_y sup_i E(i, y) - MinimaxLoomis.mu.auxPlayer II's maximum loss against mixed strategy
y: the maximum over pure rows of the expected payoff. - MinimaxLoomis.mu.aux.bddBelow
mu.aux Ais uniformly bounded below on the simplex. - stdSimplex.pure_applystdSimplex.pure_apply
- Loomis.muB.aux.bddBelow
muB.aux A Bis bounded below on the simplex.
- Used by 4
- MatrixGame.optimal_pairs_iff_saddle_pointOptimal pairs ↔ saddle points. A pair of mixed strategies is in the product
X(A) × Y(A)of optimal strategy sets iff it is a saddle… - MatrixGame.image_optimalColumnStrategies_eqMatrixGame.image_optimalColumnStrategies_eq
- MatrixGame.support_complementarity_columnSupport complementarity (column). For an optimal pair
(xx, yy), every columnjwith positive probability underyyis a best… - MatrixGame.support_complementarity_rowSupport complementarity (row). For an optimal pair
(xx, yy), every rowiwith positive probability underxxis a best response…
- MatrixGame.optimal_pairs_iff_saddle_pointOptimal pairs ↔ saddle points. A pair of mixed strategies is in the product
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen MatrixGame inopen Finset BigOperators inset_option linter.unusedSectionVars false inuniverse u invariable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] invariable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in/-- A column strategy is optimal iff against every mixed row it caps payoff at the value. -/theorem MatrixGame.mem_optimalColumnStrategies_iff_E_le (yy : stdSimplex ℝ J) : yy ∈ A.optimalColumnStrategies ↔ ∀ x' : stdSimplex ℝ I, A.E x' yy ≤ A.value := by classical unfold optimalColumnStrategies simp only [Set.mem_setOf_eq] constructor · intro hyy x' have hi : ∀ i, A.Ei i yy ≤ A.value := by intro i have : A.Ei i yy ≤ A.guarantee_II yy := Finset.le_sup' (fun i => A.Ei i yy) (Finset.mem_univ i) linarith [hyy] have heq : A.E x' yy = wsum x' (fun i => A.Ei i yy) := rfl rw [heq] exact (le_iff_simplex_le.mp hi) x' · intro h have hi : ∀ i, A.Ei i yy ≤ A.value := by intro i have := h (stdSimplex.pure i) have heq : A.E (stdSimplex.pure i) yy = A.Ei i yy := by show wsum (stdSimplex.pure i) (fun i' => wsum yy (A.g i')) = wsum yy (A.g i) rw [wsum_pure_apply] rwa [heq] at this have hle : A.guarantee_II yy ≤ A.value := by show Finset.sup' Finset.univ Finset.univ_nonempty (fun i => A.Ei i yy) ≤ A.value rw [Finset.sup'_le_iff]; intro i _; exact hi i have hge : A.value ≤ A.guarantee_II yy := by have hv := A.value_eq_minimax have : A.minimax ≤ A.guarantee_II yy := ciInf_le (bddBelow_def.2 (by obtain ⟨C, hC⟩ := MinimaxLoomis.mu.aux.bddBelow A.g exact ⟨C, by rintro r ⟨z, rfl⟩; exact hC z⟩)) yy linarith linarith