Mechanism.IsDSIC.truthful_isNash
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
If a mechanism is DSIC, then truthful reporting is a Nash equilibrium.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Mechanism in variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type*} {O U : Type*} in variable (M : Mechanism I T O) (u : O → (∀ i, T i) → I → U) in theorem Mechanism.IsDSIC.truthful_isNash [Preorder U] (hdsic : M.IsDSIC u) (v : ∀ i, T i) : IsNashEquilibrium (M.toStrategicGame u v) v
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `Mechanism.IsDSIC.truthful_isNash`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Mechanism.IsDSIC.truthful_isNash← Mechanism.IsDSIC.truthful_isNash (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/MechBasic.lean:106): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 8
- Mechanism.IsDSICDominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC). A mechanism is DSIC with respect to a utility function if for every true type profile…
- MechanismA (direct revelation) mechanism. -
I— the set of agents (indices) -T— the type space of each agent -O— the outcome space A… - IsNashEquilibriumA profile
σis a pure Nash equilibrium of gameGif every player is playing a best response: no player can profitably deviate. - Mechanism.toStrategicGameThe strategic game induced by a mechanism and a utility function. Each agent's strategy space is their type space
T i(they choose what… - IsNashEquilibrium.of_dominantT3: If every player has a weakly dominant strategy and
σassigns each player their dominant strategy, thenσis a Nash equilibrium. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Mechanism in variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type*} {O U : Type*} in variable (M : Mechanism I T O) (u : O → (∀ i, T i) → I → U) in /-- If a mechanism is DSIC, then truthful reporting is a Nash equilibrium. -/ theorem Mechanism.IsDSIC.truthful_isNash [Preorder U] (hdsic : M.IsDSIC u) (v : ∀ i, T i) : IsNashEquilibrium (M.toStrategicGame u v) v := IsNashEquilibrium.of_dominant (fun i => hdsic v i)