AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

Mechanism.IsDSIC.truthful_isNash

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

If a mechanism is DSIC, then truthful reporting is a Nash equilibrium.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Mechanism in
variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type*} {O U : Type*} in
variable (M : Mechanism I T O) (u : O → (∀ i, T i) → I → U) in
theorem Mechanism.IsDSIC.truthful_isNash [Preorder U]
    (hdsic : M.IsDSIC u) (v : ∀ i, T i) :
    IsNashEquilibrium (M.toStrategicGame u v) v
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `Mechanism.IsDSIC.truthful_isNash`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 8

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Mechanism in
variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type*} {O U : Type*} in
variable (M : Mechanism I T O) (u : O → (∀ i, T i) → I → U) in
/-- If a mechanism is DSIC, then truthful reporting is a Nash equilibrium. -/
theorem Mechanism.IsDSIC.truthful_isNash [Preorder U]
    (hdsic : M.IsDSIC u) (v : ∀ i, T i) :
    IsNashEquilibrium (M.toStrategicGame u v) v :=
  IsNashEquilibrium.of_dominant (fun i => hdsic v i)
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