Mechanism.IsDSIC
defimported Lean
Dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC). A mechanism is DSIC with respect to a utility function if for every true type profile v, truthful reporting v i is a weakly dominant strategy for every agent i in the induced strategic game. This reuses IsWeaklyDominant from StrategicGame.Dominance — no redundant definition.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Mechanism in variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type*} {O U : Type*} in variable (M : Mechanism I T O) (u : O → (∀ i, T i) → I → U) in def Mechanism.IsDSIC [Preorder U] : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `Mechanism.IsDSIC`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Mechanism.IsDSIC← Mechanism.IsDSIC (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/MechBasic.lean:96): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 7
- MechanismA (direct revelation) mechanism. -
I— the set of agents (indices) -T— the type space of each agent -O— the outcome space A… - IsWeaklyDominantStrategy
sis weakly dominant for playeri. - Mechanism.toStrategicGameThe strategic game induced by a mechanism and a utility function. Each agent's strategy space is their type space
T i(they choose what… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- StrategicGameA strategic-form game with player type Player consists of a family of strategy types Strategy i for each player i : Player, and a…
- MechanismA (direct revelation) mechanism. -
- Used by 1
- Mechanism.IsDSIC.truthful_isNashIf a mechanism is DSIC, then truthful reporting is a Nash equilibrium.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Mechanism in variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type*} {O U : Type*} in variable (M : Mechanism I T O) (u : O → (∀ i, T i) → I → U) in /-- Dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC). A mechanism is DSIC with respect to a utility function if for every true type profile `v`, truthful reporting `v i` is a weakly dominant strategy for every agent `i` in the induced strategic game. This reuses `IsWeaklyDominant` from `StrategicGame.Dominance` — no redundant definition. -/ def Mechanism.IsDSIC [Preorder U] : Prop := ∀ v : (∀ i, T i), ∀ i : I, IsWeaklyDominant (M.toStrategicGame u v) i (v i)