AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

Mechanism.IsDSIC

defimported Lean

Dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC). A mechanism is DSIC with respect to a utility function if for every true type profile v, truthful reporting v i is a weakly dominant strategy for every agent i in the induced strategic game. This reuses IsWeaklyDominant from StrategicGame.Dominance — no redundant definition.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Mechanism in
variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type*} {O U : Type*} in
variable (M : Mechanism I T O) (u : O → (∀ i, T i) → I → U) in
def Mechanism.IsDSIC [Preorder U] : Prop
Defined in
EconCSLib, `Mechanism.IsDSIC`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
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set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Mechanism in
variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type*} {O U : Type*} in
variable (M : Mechanism I T O) (u : O → (∀ i, T i) → I → U) in
/-- Dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC). A mechanism is DSIC with respect to a utility function if for every true type profile `v`, truthful reporting `v i` is a weakly dominant strategy for every agent `i` in the induced strategic game. This reuses `IsWeaklyDominant` from `StrategicGame.Dominance` — no redundant definition. -/
def Mechanism.IsDSIC [Preorder U] : Prop :=
  ∀ v : (∀ i, T i), ∀ i : I, IsWeaklyDominant (M.toStrategicGame u v) i (v i)
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