AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

MultipleParameterMechanism.vcgPayment

defimported Lean

The Clarke-pivot VCG payment charged to agent i: the best welfare that the other agents could get without i, minus the other agents' welfare at the efficient allocation chosen from all reports.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open scoped BigOperators in
variable {I A : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] in
variable [DecidableEq I] in
noncomputable def MultipleParameterMechanism.vcgPayment (v : ∀ _ : I, Valuation A ℝ) (i : I) : ℝ
Defined in
EconCSLib, `MultipleParameterMechanism.vcgPayment`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
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set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open scoped BigOperators in
variable {I A : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] in
variable [DecidableEq I] in
/-- The Clarke-pivot VCG payment charged to agent `i`: the best welfare that the other agents could get without `i`, minus the other agents' welfare at the efficient allocation chosen from all reports. -/
noncomputable def MultipleParameterMechanism.vcgPayment (v : ∀ _ : I, Valuation A ℝ) (i : I) : ℝ :=
  maxWelfareWithout v i - welfareWithout v i (efficientAllocation v)
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