MultipleParameterMechanism.vcgPayment
defimported Lean
The Clarke-pivot VCG payment charged to agent i: the best welfare that the other agents could get without i, minus the other agents' welfare at the efficient allocation chosen from all reports.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open scoped BigOperators in variable {I A : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] in variable [DecidableEq I] in noncomputable def MultipleParameterMechanism.vcgPayment (v : ∀ _ : I, Valuation A ℝ) (i : I) : ℝ
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `MultipleParameterMechanism.vcgPayment`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MultipleParameterMechanism.vcgPayment← MultipleParameterMechanism.vcgPayment (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/VCG.lean:172): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 4
- MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithoutReported social welfare of all agents except
i. - MultipleParameterMechanism.maxWelfareWithoutThe maximum reported welfare of agents other than
i. - MultipleParameterMechanism.ValuationThe valuation/type space of an agent in a multiple-parameter mechanism.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.efficientAllocationA welfare-maximizing allocation, chosen noncomputably from finite
A.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithoutReported social welfare of all agents except
- Used by 4
- MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanismThe finite-allocation VCG mechanism induced by welfare maximization and Clarke-pivot payments.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_quasiLinearUtility_nonnegIf agent
ireports truthfully in the VCG mechanism, then their quasi-linear utility is nonnegative against arbitrary reports by the… - MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_quasiLinearUtility_eq_socialWelfare_sub_maxWelfareWithoutVCG utility can be rewritten as total welfare under the profile that uses agent
i's true valuation and keeps all other reports fixed,… - MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_isExPostIR_of_all_nonnegativeVCG satisfies the
MechanismWithTransfers.isExPostIRpredicate under the ambient assumption that every valuation in the unrestricted type…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open scoped BigOperators in variable {I A : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] in variable [DecidableEq I] in /-- The Clarke-pivot VCG payment charged to agent `i`: the best welfare that the other agents could get without `i`, minus the other agents' welfare at the efficient allocation chosen from all reports. -/ noncomputable def MultipleParameterMechanism.vcgPayment (v : ∀ _ : I, Valuation A ℝ) (i : I) : ℝ := maxWelfareWithout v i - welfareWithout v i (efficientAllocation v)