AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_quasiLinearUtility_eq_socialWelfare_sub_maxWelfareWithout

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

VCG utility can be rewritten as total welfare under the profile that uses agent i's true valuation and keeps all other reports fixed, minus the maximal welfare achievable by the other agents alone.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open MultipleParameterMechanism in
open scoped BigOperators in
variable {I A : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] in
variable [DecidableEq I] in
lemma MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_quasiLinearUtility_eq_socialWelfare_sub_maxWelfareWithout
    (reports trueTypes : ∀ _ : I, Valuation A ℝ) (i : I) :
    MechanismWithTransfers.quasiLinearUtility
        VCGTransferMechanism valueOfAllocation id id reports trueTypes i =
      socialWelfare (Function.update reports i (trueTypes i)) (efficientAllocation reports) -
        maxWelfareWithout reports i
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_quasiLinearUtility_eq_socialWelfare_sub_maxWelfareWithout`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 13

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen MultipleParameterMechanism inopen scoped BigOperators invariable {I A : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] invariable [DecidableEq I] in/-- VCG utility can be rewritten as total welfare under the profile that uses agent `i`'s true valuation and keeps all other reports fixed, minus the maximal welfare achievable by the other agents alone. -/lemma MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_quasiLinearUtility_eq_socialWelfare_sub_maxWelfareWithout    (reports trueTypes : ∀ _ : I, Valuation A ℝ) (i : I) :    MechanismWithTransfers.quasiLinearUtility        VCGTransferMechanism valueOfAllocation id id reports trueTypes i =      socialWelfare (Function.update reports i (trueTypes i)) (efficientAllocation reports) -        maxWelfareWithout reports i := by  let aStar := efficientAllocation reports  have hdecomp :      socialWelfare (Function.update reports i (trueTypes i)) aStar =        trueTypes i aStar + welfareWithout reports i aStar := by    simpa [Function.update, welfareWithout_update_self reports i (trueTypes i) aStar] using      socialWelfare_eq_value_add_welfareWithout        (Function.update reports i (trueTypes i)) i aStar  simp [MechanismWithTransfers.quasiLinearUtility, valueOfAllocation,    VCGTransferMechanism, VCGMechanism, vcgPayment]  dsimp [aStar] at hdecomp  linarith
See it in the graphDiscuss this resultChallenge it