MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_quasiLinearUtility_nonneg
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
If agent i reports truthfully in the VCG mechanism, then their quasi-linear utility is nonnegative against arbitrary reports by the other agents, assuming i's true valuation is nonnegative.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MultipleParameterMechanism in open scoped BigOperators in variable {I A : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] in variable [DecidableEq I] in theorem MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_quasiLinearUtility_nonneg (v : ∀ _ : I, Valuation A ℝ) (hnonneg : ∀ i : I, ∀ a : A, 0 ≤ v i a) (i : I) (r : ∀ _ : I, Valuation A ℝ) : 0 ≤ MechanismWithTransfers.quasiLinearUtility VCGTransferMechanism valueOfAllocation id id (Function.update r i (v i)) v i
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_quasiLinearUtility_nonneg`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_quasiLinearUtility_nonneg← MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_quasiLinearUtility_nonneg (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/VCG.lean:214): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 15
- MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanismThe finite-allocation VCG mechanism induced by welfare maximization and Clarke-pivot payments.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGTransferMechanismThe underlying transfer mechanism of
VCGMechanism. This is the object to which the generic definitions inTransfer.lean, such as… - MultipleParameterMechanism.ValuationThe valuation/type space of an agent in a multiple-parameter mechanism.
- MechanismWithTransfers.quasiLinearUtilityQuasi-linear utility induced by: - a valuation function on allocations - an embedding of payments into utility space - subtraction in the…
- MultipleParameterMechanism.valueOfAllocationThe value extractor used by the generic quasi-linear transfer definitions: agent
ievaluates allocationaby applying their valuation… - MultipleParameterMechanism.efficientAllocationA welfare-maximizing allocation, chosen noncomputably from finite
A. - MultipleParameterMechanism.maxWelfareWithoutThe maximum reported welfare of agents other than
i. - MultipleParameterMechanism.socialWelfareReported social welfare of allocation
aunder a profile of valuations. - MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithoutReported social welfare of all agents except
i. - MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithout_le_socialWelfare_of_nonneg_iIf agent
i's valuation is nonnegative, then the welfare of agents other thaniis bounded by total social welfare. - MultipleParameterMechanism.efficientAllocation_isOptimalThe chosen VCG allocation maximizes reported social welfare.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.socialWelfare_eq_value_add_welfareWithoutSocial welfare decomposes into agent
i's value plus the welfare of the other agents. - MultipleParameterMechanismA multiple-parameter mechanism with transfers. Here
Ais the type of feasible allocations andVis the codomain of valuations. Agent… - MultipleParameterMechanism.vcgPaymentThe Clarke-pivot VCG payment charged to agent
i: the best welfare that the other agents could get withouti, minus the other agents'… - MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space…
- Used by 2
- MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_profile_quasiLinearUtility_nonnegThe same nonnegative-utility result for the fully truthful report profile.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_isExPostIR_of_all_nonnegativeVCG satisfies the
MechanismWithTransfers.isExPostIRpredicate under the ambient assumption that every valuation in the unrestricted type…
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen MultipleParameterMechanism inopen scoped BigOperators invariable {I A : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] invariable [DecidableEq I] in/-- If agent `i` reports truthfully in the VCG mechanism, then their quasi-linear utility is nonnegative against arbitrary reports by the other agents, assuming `i`'s true valuation is nonnegative. -/theorem MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_quasiLinearUtility_nonneg (v : ∀ _ : I, Valuation A ℝ) (hnonneg : ∀ i : I, ∀ a : A, 0 ≤ v i a) (i : I) (r : ∀ _ : I, Valuation A ℝ) : 0 ≤ MechanismWithTransfers.quasiLinearUtility VCGTransferMechanism valueOfAllocation id id (Function.update r i (v i)) v i := by let reports := Function.update r i (v i) let aStar := efficientAllocation reports have hi_nonneg : ∀ a : A, 0 ≤ reports i a := by intro a simp [reports, hnonneg i a] have hmax_le : maxWelfareWithout reports i ≤ socialWelfare reports aStar := by rw [maxWelfareWithout] exact Finset.sup'_le Finset.univ_nonempty (welfareWithout reports i) (fun a _ => le_trans (welfareWithout_le_socialWelfare_of_nonneg_i reports i hi_nonneg a) (efficientAllocation_isOptimal reports a)) have hdecomp : socialWelfare reports aStar = reports i aStar + welfareWithout reports i aStar := socialWelfare_eq_value_add_welfareWithout reports i aStar have hreport_i : reports i aStar = v i aStar := by simp [reports] simp [MechanismWithTransfers.quasiLinearUtility, valueOfAllocation, VCGTransferMechanism, VCGMechanism, vcgPayment] dsimp [reports, aStar] at hmax_le hdecomp hreport_i linarith