MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithout
defimported Lean
Reported social welfare of all agents except i.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open scoped BigOperators in variable {I A : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] in variable [DecidableEq I] in def MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithout (v : ∀ _ : I, Valuation A ℝ) (i : I) (a : A) : ℝ
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithout`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithout← MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithout (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/VCG.lean:83): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- MultipleParameterMechanism.ValuationThe valuation/type space of an agent in a multiple-parameter mechanism.
- Used by 12
- MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithout_update_selfChanging agent
i's report does not change the welfare of agents other thani. - MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_quasiLinearUtility_nonnegIf agent
ireports truthfully in the VCG mechanism, then their quasi-linear utility is nonnegative against arbitrary reports by the… - MultipleParameterMechanism.maxWelfareWithout_update_selfChanging agent
i's report does not change the maximum welfare achievable by the other agents. - MultipleParameterMechanism.vcgPaymentThe Clarke-pivot VCG payment charged to agent
i: the best welfare that the other agents could get withouti, minus the other agents'… - MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithout_le_socialWelfare_of_nonneg_iIf agent
i's valuation is nonnegative, then the welfare of agents other thaniis bounded by total social welfare. - MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_quasiLinearUtility_eq_socialWelfare_sub_maxWelfareWithoutVCG utility can be rewritten as total welfare under the profile that uses agent
i's true valuation and keeps all other reports fixed,… - MultipleParameterMechanism.withoutAllocation_isOptimalThe chosen allocation without agent
imaximizes the reported welfare of the other agents. - MultipleParameterMechanism.withoutAllocationA welfare-maximizing allocation for agents other than
i. - MultipleParameterMechanism.maxWelfareWithoutThe maximum reported welfare of agents other than
i. - MultipleParameterMechanism.socialWelfare_eq_value_add_welfareWithoutSocial welfare decomposes into agent
i's value plus the welfare of the other agents. - MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithout_le_socialWelfareIf all valuations are nonnegative, then the welfare of agents other than
iis bounded by total social welfare. - MultipleParameterMechanism.exists_withoutAllocationThere exists an allocation maximizing the reported welfare of agents other than
i.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithout_update_selfChanging agent
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open scoped BigOperators in variable {I A : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] in variable [DecidableEq I] in /-- Reported social welfare of all agents except `i`. -/ def MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithout (v : ∀ _ : I, Valuation A ℝ) (i : I) (a : A) : ℝ := (Finset.univ.erase i).sum fun j => v j a