MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithout_le_socialWelfare_of_nonneg_i
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
If agent i's valuation is nonnegative, then the welfare of agents other than i is bounded by total social welfare.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open scoped BigOperators in variable {I A : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] in variable [DecidableEq I] in omit [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] in lemma MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithout_le_socialWelfare_of_nonneg_i (v : ∀ _ : I, Valuation A ℝ) (i : I) (hi_nonneg : ∀ a : A, 0 ≤ v i a) (a : A) : welfareWithout v i a ≤ socialWelfare v a
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithout_le_socialWelfare_of_nonneg_i`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithout_le_socialWelfare_of_nonneg_i← MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithout_le_socialWelfare_of_nonneg_i (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/VCG.lean:111): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 4
- MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithoutReported social welfare of all agents except
i. - MultipleParameterMechanism.socialWelfareReported social welfare of allocation
aunder a profile of valuations. - MultipleParameterMechanism.socialWelfare_eq_value_add_welfareWithoutSocial welfare decomposes into agent
i's value plus the welfare of the other agents. - MultipleParameterMechanism.ValuationThe valuation/type space of an agent in a multiple-parameter mechanism.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithoutReported social welfare of all agents except
- Used by 1
- MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_quasiLinearUtility_nonnegIf agent
ireports truthfully in the VCG mechanism, then their quasi-linear utility is nonnegative against arbitrary reports by the…
- MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_quasiLinearUtility_nonnegIf agent
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen scoped BigOperators invariable {I A : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] invariable [DecidableEq I] inomit [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] in/-- If agent `i`'s valuation is nonnegative, then the welfare of agents other than `i` is bounded by total social welfare. -/lemma MultipleParameterMechanism.welfareWithout_le_socialWelfare_of_nonneg_i (v : ∀ _ : I, Valuation A ℝ) (i : I) (hi_nonneg : ∀ a : A, 0 ≤ v i a) (a : A) : welfareWithout v i a ≤ socialWelfare v a := by have hdecomp := socialWelfare_eq_value_add_welfareWithout v i a have hi := hi_nonneg a linarith