IsWeaklyDominant.isBestResponse
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
T2: A weakly dominant strategy is a best response to any profile where player i plays it.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in theorem IsWeaklyDominant.isBestResponse {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} {i : N} {s : G.strategy i} (hdom : IsWeaklyDominant G i s) (σ : G.Profile) (hσ : σ i = s) : IsBestResponse G σ i
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `IsWeaklyDominant.isBestResponse`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.IsWeaklyDominant.isBestResponse← IsWeaklyDominant.isBestResponse (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/Dominance.lean:59): adapted
What was changed in
IsWeaklyDominant.isBestResponse--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/Dominance.lean:59 (IsWeaklyDominant.isBestResponse) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,3 +1,6 @@ -/-- T2: A weakly dominant strategy is a best response to any profile where player `i` plays it. -/ -theorem IsWeaklyDominant.isBestResponse {G : StrategicGame N U} {i : N} {s : G.strategy i} +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in +open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in +theorem IsWeaklyDominant.isBestResponse {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} {i : N} {s : G.strategy i} (hdom : IsWeaklyDominant G i s) (σ : G.Profile) (hσ : σ i = s) : - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 9
- IsBestResponsePlayer
iis playing a best response to profileσin gameGif no unilateral deviation to any strategys'yields a higher payoff. - IsWeaklyDominantStrategy
sis weakly dominant for playeri. - EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
G: each player picks a strategy. This is a dependent function∀ i, G.strategy i. The profile… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateUnilateral deviation in a game-bound profile: player
iswitches tos', while all other players keep their current strategies. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same value is the identity.
- IsBestResponsePlayer
- Used by 1
- IsNashEquilibrium.of_dominantT3: If every player has a weakly dominant strategy and
σassigns each player their dominant strategy, thenσis a Nash equilibrium.
- IsNashEquilibrium.of_dominantT3: If every player has a weakly dominant strategy and
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] inopen EconCSLib.StrategicGame in/-- T2: A weakly dominant strategy is a best response to any profile where player `i` plays it. -/theorem IsWeaklyDominant.isBestResponse {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} {i : N} {s : G.strategy i} (hdom : IsWeaklyDominant G i s) (σ : G.Profile) (hσ : σ i = s) : IsBestResponse G σ i := by intro s' have h := hdom s' σ simp only [← hσ, Profile.deviate_self] at h exact h