EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.survives
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Nash equilibrium strategies survive all rounds. [MSZ 4.31]
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.survives {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} {σ : G.Profile} (hN : IsNashEquilibrium G σ) : ∀ (n : ℕ) (i : N), G.Survives n i (σ i)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.survives`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.survives← StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.survives (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/IESDS.lean:65): adapted
What was changed in
EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.survives--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/IESDS.lean:65 (StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.survives) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,3 +1,7 @@ -/-- Nash equilibrium strategies survive all rounds. [MSZ 4.31] -/ -theorem IsNashEquilibrium.survives {G : StrategicGame N U} +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in +variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in +open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in +theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.survives {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} {σ : G.Profile} (hN : IsNashEquilibrium G σ) : @@ -8,3 +12,3 @@ intro i; refine ⟨ih i, ?_⟩ - -- Need: ¬ ∃ t, Survives n i t ∧ ∀ σ', (∀ j, Survives n j (σ' j)) → payoff(deviate σ' i (σ i)) < payoff(deviate σ' i t) + -- Need: ¬ ∃ t, Survives n i t ∧ ∀ σ', (∀ j, Survives n j (σ' j)) → payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ' i (σ i)) < payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ' i t) intro ⟨t, _, hdom⟩ @@ -12,5 +16,5 @@ have hd := hdom σ ih - -- This says: payoff(σ, i) < payoff(deviate σ i t, i) (since deviate σ i (σ i) = σ) + -- This says: payoff(σ, i) < payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ i t, i) (since EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ i (σ i) = σ) simp [Profile.deviate_self] at hd - -- But Nash says σ i is a best response: payoff(deviate σ i t, i) ≤ payoff(σ, i) + -- But Nash says σ i is a best response: payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ i t, i) ≤ payoff(σ, i) exact absurd (lt_of_lt_of_le hd (hN i t)) (lt_irrefl _) - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 9
- IsNashEquilibriumA profile
σis a pure Nash equilibrium of gameGif every player is playing a best response: no player can profitably deviate. - EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
G: each player picks a strategy. This is a dependent function∀ i, G.strategy i. The profile… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.SurvivesA strategy survives round
nof iterated strict dominance elimination. Round 0: all strategies survive. Round n+1:ssurvives if it… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateUnilateral deviation in a game-bound profile: player
iswitches tos', while all other players keep their current strategies. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same value is the identity.
- IsNashEquilibriumA profile
- Used by 1
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.isRationalizableNash strategies are rationalizable.
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen EconCSLib.StrategicGame invariable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] inopen EconCSLib.StrategicGame in/-- Nash equilibrium strategies survive all rounds. [MSZ 4.31] -/theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.survives {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} {σ : G.Profile} (hN : IsNashEquilibrium G σ) : ∀ (n : ℕ) (i : N), G.Survives n i (σ i) := by intro n; induction n with | zero => intro _; trivial | succ n ih => intro i; refine ⟨ih i, ?_⟩ -- Need: ¬ ∃ t, Survives n i t ∧ ∀ σ', (∀ j, Survives n j (σ' j)) → payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ' i (σ i)) < payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ' i t) intro ⟨t, _, hdom⟩ -- Specialize hdom to the Nash profile σ (whose strategies all survive by ih) have hd := hdom σ ih -- This says: payoff(σ, i) < payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ i t, i) (since EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ i (σ i) = σ) simp [Profile.deviate_self] at hd -- But Nash says σ i is a best response: payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ i t, i) ≤ payoff(σ, i) exact absurd (lt_of_lt_of_le hd (hN i t)) (lt_irrefl _)