AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.survives

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

Nash equilibrium strategies survive all rounds. [MSZ 4.31]

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in
variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in
open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in
theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.survives {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U}
    {σ : G.Profile} (hN : IsNashEquilibrium G σ) :
    ∀ (n : ℕ) (i : N), G.Survives n i (σ i)
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.survives`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
What was changed in EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.survives
--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/IESDS.lean:65 (StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.survives)
+++ as compiled here
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
-/-- Nash equilibrium strategies survive all rounds. [MSZ 4.31] -/
-theorem IsNashEquilibrium.survives {G : StrategicGame N U}
+set_option autoImplicit true in
+set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
+open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in
+variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in
+open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in
+theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.survives {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U}
     {σ : G.Profile} (hN : IsNashEquilibrium G σ) :
@@ -8,3 +12,3 @@
     intro i; refine ⟨ih i, ?_⟩
-    -- Need: ¬ ∃ t, Survives n i t ∧ ∀ σ', (∀ j, Survives n j (σ' j)) → payoff(deviate σ' i (σ i)) < payoff(deviate σ' i t)
+    -- Need: ¬ ∃ t, Survives n i t ∧ ∀ σ', (∀ j, Survives n j (σ' j)) → payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ' i (σ i)) < payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ' i t)
     intro ⟨t, _, hdom⟩
@@ -12,5 +16,5 @@
     have hd := hdom σ ih
-    -- This says: payoff(σ, i) < payoff(deviate σ i t, i) (since deviate σ i (σ i) = σ)
+    -- This says: payoff(σ, i) < payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ i t, i) (since EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ i (σ i) = σ)
     simp [Profile.deviate_self] at hd
-    -- But Nash says σ i is a best response: payoff(deviate σ i t, i) ≤ payoff(σ, i)
+    -- But Nash says σ i is a best response: payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ i t, i) ≤ payoff(σ, i)
     exact absurd (lt_of_lt_of_le hd (hN i t)) (lt_irrefl _)
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 9
Used by 1

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen EconCSLib.StrategicGame invariable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] inopen EconCSLib.StrategicGame in/-- Nash equilibrium strategies survive all rounds. [MSZ 4.31] -/theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.survives {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U}    {σ : G.Profile} (hN : IsNashEquilibrium G σ) :    ∀ (n : ℕ) (i : N), G.Survives n i (σ i) := by  intro n; induction n with  | zero => intro _; trivial  | succ n ih =>    intro i; refine ⟨ih i, ?_⟩    -- Need: ¬ ∃ t, Survives n i t ∧ ∀ σ', (∀ j, Survives n j (σ' j)) → payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ' i (σ i)) < payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ' i t)    intro ⟨t, _, hdom⟩    -- Specialize hdom to the Nash profile σ (whose strategies all survive by ih)    have hd := hdom σ ih    -- This says: payoff(σ, i) < payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ i t, i) (since EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ i (σ i) = σ)    simp [Profile.deviate_self] at hd    -- But Nash says σ i is a best response: payoff(EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviate σ i t, i) ≤ payoff(σ, i)    exact absurd (lt_of_lt_of_le hd (hN i t)) (lt_irrefl _)
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