SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_quasiLinearUtility_eq
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Utility under the canonical Myerson payment rule can be written in the standard envelope-friendly form.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open SingleParameterMechanism in variable {I : Type*} in lemma SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_quasiLinearUtility_eq [DecidableEq I] (x : (I → ℝ) → I → ℝ) (v b : I → ℝ) (i : I) : (withMyersonPayment x).quasiLinearUtility b v i = (v i - b i) * x b i + ∫ z in 0..b i, x (Function.update b i z) i
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_quasiLinearUtility_eq`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_quasiLinearUtility_eq← SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_quasiLinearUtility_eq (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Myerson.lean:61): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 6
- SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPaymentThe single-parameter mechanism obtained by equipping an allocation rule with its canonical Myerson payment rule.
- SingleParameterMechanism.quasiLinearUtilityQuasi-linear utility in the single-parameter setting:
uᵢ(θ, b) = θᵢ * xᵢ(b) - pᵢ(b). - SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
ihas a single private typeθ_i : R(their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent… - SingleParameterMechanism.paymentThe payment vector induced by a bid profile in a single-parameter mechanism. This is just the inherited…
- SingleParameterMechanism.quasiLinearValueQuasi-linear value in the single-parameter setting: agent
iwith true typeθᵢgets allocationxᵢ, worthθᵢ * xᵢ. - SingleParameterMechanism.myersonPaymentThe canonical Myerson payment formula associated with an allocation rule
x. Holding all other bids fixed, agentipays…
- Used by 2
- SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_isDSIC_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma, Property 2: a monotone allocation rule is DSIC when paired with the canonical Myerson payment rule.
- SingleParameterMechanism.payment_formula_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalizedExplicit payment identity used in Myerson's Lemma: for a DSIC single-parameter mechanism with zero-normalized payments, the payment rule…
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen SingleParameterMechanism invariable {I : Type*} in/-- Utility under the canonical Myerson payment rule can be written in the standard envelope-friendly form. -/lemma SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_quasiLinearUtility_eq [DecidableEq I] (x : (I → ℝ) → I → ℝ) (v b : I → ℝ) (i : I) : (withMyersonPayment x).quasiLinearUtility b v i = (v i - b i) * x b i + ∫ z in 0..b i, x (Function.update b i z) i := by simp [SingleParameterMechanism.quasiLinearUtility, SingleParameterMechanism.quasiLinearValue, SingleParameterMechanism.payment, withMyersonPayment, myersonPayment] ring