SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment
defimported Lean
The single-parameter mechanism obtained by equipping an allocation rule with its canonical Myerson payment rule.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open SingleParameterMechanism in variable {I : Type*} in noncomputable def SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment [DecidableEq I] (x : (I → ℝ) → I → ℝ) : SingleParameterMechanism I ℝ
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment← SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Myerson.lean:53): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 3
- SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
ihas a single private typeθ_i : R(their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent… - MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - SingleParameterMechanism.myersonPaymentThe canonical Myerson payment formula associated with an allocation rule
x. Holding all other bids fixed, agentipays…
- SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
- Used by 6
- SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_isDSIC_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma, Property 2: a monotone allocation rule is DSIC when paired with the canonical Myerson payment rule.
- SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_quasiLinearUtility_eqUtility under the canonical Myerson payment rule can be written in the standard envelope-friendly form.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimPaymentIntegrand_boundFor each fixed report, the constructed Myerson payment integrand is bounded uniformly over opponent profiles.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPaymentBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPayment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasIntegrableInterimObjects_of_aestronglyMeasurableOnce the constructed allocation and payment integrands are measurable, boundedness gives interim integrability for the constructed auction.
- SingleParameterMechanism.isImplementable_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma, Property 2, reformulated: an allocation rule is implementable if it is monotone.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open SingleParameterMechanism in variable {I : Type*} in /-- The single-parameter mechanism obtained by equipping an allocation rule with its canonical Myerson payment rule. -/ noncomputable def SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment [DecidableEq I] (x : (I → ℝ) → I → ℝ) : SingleParameterMechanism I ℝ where allocationRule := x paymentRule := myersonPayment x