SingleParameterMechanism
structureimported Lean
A single-parameter mechanism. Each agent i has a single private type θ_i : R (their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent a scalar x_i : R (typically in [0, 1], interpreted as probability of winning or fractional quantity received). Payments are of the same scalar type R; utility is quasi-linear: θ_i · x_i - p_i. In practice R = ℝ. The structure is kept polymorphic for generality. This is the canonical setting for Myerson's revenue-optimal auction theorem and for characterizing implementable (DSIC) allocation rules via monotonicity.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in structure SingleParameterMechanism (I : Type*) (R : Type*) extends MechanismWithTransfers I (fun _ => R) (I → R) R
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SingleParameterMechanism`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SingleParameterMechanism← SingleParameterMechanism (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Transfer.lean:163): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space…
- MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
- Used by 101
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsZeroNormalizedZero normalization for a Bayesian single-item auction's payment rule: reporting
0gives payment0, holding the other reports fixed. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanismBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanism
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalInEnvironmentAmongRevenueComparableRevenue optimality among revenue-comparable candidates.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuctionRegular Myerson optimality among feasible IC/IR mechanisms.
- SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_isDSIC_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma, Property 2: a monotone allocation rule is DSIC when paired with the canonical Myerson payment rule.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.integrableVirtualSurplusBayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.integrableVirtualSurplus
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasExpectedVirtualSurplusInterimIdentityEx-ante virtual surplus agrees with the interim expression.
- SingleParameterMechanism.payment_difference_boundIf two payment rules implement the same allocation rule in DSIC form, then their difference along a one-dimensional deviation is…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.TypeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.toInterimFubiniBayesianSingleItemAuction.TypeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.toInterimFubini
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueUpperBounded_of_isRevenueComparableBayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueUpperBounded_of_isRevenueComparable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasMyersonPaymentRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentityMyerson-payment revenue equals expected virtual surplus.
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsAllocFeasibleAllocation feasibility: each agent's allocation lies in
[0, 1]. RequiresZero R,One R, andLE R(e.g., any linearly ordered field). - SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSICDominant-strategy incentive compatibility in the single-parameter, quasi-linear setting. Truthful reporting
θᵢis weakly dominant for… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironmentExpected seller revenue of
B, evaluated in environmentA. - SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_quasiLinearUtility_eqUtility under the canonical Myerson payment rule can be written in the standard envelope-friendly form.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isFeasibleBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isFeasible
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentInterimFubiniAssumptions_of_typeMeasure_fubiniBuild payment-side interim Fubini hypotheses from type-measure Fubini.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProbInterim allocation probability
q_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isFeasibleThe constructed auction is feasible.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_interim_identitiesBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_interim_identities
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasIntegrableInterimAllocation_of_isFeasible_of_aestronglyMeasurableFeasibility and a.e. strong measurability imply allocation integrability.
- SingleParameterMechanism.payment_eq_myersonPayment_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalizedUniqueness of zero-normalized DSIC payment rules: among zero-normalized payment rules, the canonical Myerson payment rule is the unique…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_of_expectedVirtualSurplus_leVirtual-surplus comparison gives revenue comparison under identity.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRule
- KnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotoneKnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotone
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPaymentBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPayment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasIntegrableInterimObjects_of_aestronglyMeasurableOnce the constructed allocation and payment integrands are measurable, boundedness gives interim integrability for the constructed auction.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.expectedPaymentRevenueIntegrableBayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.expectedPaymentRevenueIntegrable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule
- SingleParameterMechanism.existsUnique_zeroNormalized_payment_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma
(b): ifxis monotone, then there is a unique zero-normalized payment rule making(x, p)DSIC. - KnapsackAuctionA knapsack auction with public weights
w iand total capacityW. The underlying strategic object is aSingleParameterMechanism I U,… - SingleParameterMechanism.IsMonotoneMonotonicity of the allocation rule. Agent
i's allocation is non-decreasing ini's reported type, holding all other reports fixed.… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanismThe virtual-surplus allocation rule paired with its Myerson payment.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isRevenueUpperBoundedBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isRevenueUpperBounded
- SingleParameterMechanism.isMonotone_of_isDSICMyerson Lemma, Property 1: every DSIC single-parameter mechanism has a monotone allocation rule.
- SingleParameterMechanism.payment_formula_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalizedExplicit payment identity used in Myerson's Lemma: for a DSIC single-parameter mechanism with zero-normalized payments, the payment rule…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptionsFubini hypotheses connecting ex-ante and interim expressions.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.sellerRevenueSeller revenue at a report profile.
- SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPaymentThe single-parameter mechanism obtained by equipping an allocation rule with its canonical Myerson payment rule.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_interim_identitiesBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_interim_identities
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand_le_of_isDSICPointwise DSIC inequality for the interim utility integrand.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotone_of_isRegularUnder regularity, the deterministic virtual-surplus-maximizing allocation rule is monotone in the sense required by…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersView an incomplete-information single-item auction as the corresponding direct Bayesian mechanism with transfers.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isRevenueComparableBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isRevenueComparable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBoundExpected revenue is bounded above by expected virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_le_one_of_isFeasibleFeasible auctions have interim allocation probabilities at most
1. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIncentiveCompatibleBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIncentiveCompatible
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_of_revenueUpperBoundedBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_of_revenueUpperBounded
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_zero_of_isZeroNormalizedA zero-normalized payment rule has zero interim expected payment at type
0. - SingleParameterMechanism.quasiLinearValueQuasi-linear value in the single-parameter setting: agent
iwith true typeθᵢgets allocationxᵢ, worthθᵢ * xᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_identityBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_identity
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimPaymentIntegrandPayment integrand for interim payment.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocationIntegrandAllocation integrand for interim probability.
- SingleParameterMechanism.quasiLinearUtility_eq_transferQuasiLinearUtilityThe single-parameter quasi-linear utility is the specialization of the generic transfer-mechanism quasi-linear utility to…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.intervalIntegrable_interimAllocProb_mul_virtualValue_mul_typeDensity_of_profileSplit_integrableProduct-side virtual-surplus integrability gives interval integrability of the density-weighted interim virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuctionBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueComparable_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueComparable_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.PaymentInterimFubiniAssumptions.expectedPaymentRevenueIntegrableBayesianSingleItemAuction.PaymentInterimFubiniAssumptions.expectedPaymentRevenueIntegrable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.TypeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptionsType-measure Fubini hypotheses.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.typeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions_of_typeMeasure_fubiniBayesianSingleItemAuction.typeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions_of_typeMeasure_fubini
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsImplementableAn allocation rule is implementable if there exists some payment rule such that the resulting single-parameter mechanism is DSIC.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptionsAnalytic assumptions for MSZ 12.59.
- SingleParameterMechanism.quasiLinearUtilityQuasi-linear utility in the single-parameter setting:
uᵢ(θ, b) = θᵢ * xᵢ(b) - pᵢ(b). - SingleParameterMechanism.paymentThe payment vector induced by a bid profile in a single-parameter mechanism. This is just the inherited…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_myersonPayment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_myersonPayment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.existsUnique_zeroNormalized_paymentRule_for_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.existsUnique_zeroNormalized_paymentRule_for_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentityExpected revenue equals expected virtual surplus.
- SingleParameterMechanism.isImplementable_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma, Property 2, reformulated: an allocation rule is implementable if it is monotone.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.PaymentInterimFubiniAssumptions.hasExpectedRevenueInterimPaymentIdentityBayesianSingleItemAuction.PaymentInterimFubiniAssumptions.hasExpectedRevenueInterimPaymentIdentity
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.hasExpectedVirtualSurplusInterimIdentityBayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.hasExpectedVirtualSurplusInterimIdentity
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_nonneg_of_isFeasibleFeasible auctions have nonnegative interim allocation probabilities.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsFeasible.isSingleItemAllocationRuleAuction feasibility gives allocation-rule feasibility.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.myersonPaymentRevenueInEnvironmentMyerson-payment revenue of
B, evaluated in environmentA. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRevenueComparableFeasible candidates with revenue equal to virtual surplus.
- KnapsackAuction.RespectsCapacityThe allocation rule respects the knapsack capacity constraint.
- SingleParameterMechanism.isImplementable_iff_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma
(a): an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it is monotone. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.RespectsSingleItemCapacityThe allocation rule respects the single-item probability budget.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_of_isFeasibleBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_of_isFeasible
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule_isVirtualSurplusOptimalThe allocation rule of the Myerson-payment mechanism is virtual-surplus optimal. This exposes the optimal-allocation content at the…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRuleThe allocation rule of the constructed Bayesian auction is ex-ante virtual-surplus optimal under the same explicit integrability…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRevenueUpperBoundedFeasible candidates with revenue bounded by virtual surplus.
- KnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizingMechanismThe canonical welfare-maximizing single-parameter knapsack mechanism, with payments given by the Myerson formula.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_eq_myersonPaymentRevenueInEnvironment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_eq_myersonPaymentRevenueInEnvironment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimal
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsFeasibleICIRIntegrableFeasible IC/IR candidates with integrable virtual surplus.
- KnapsackAuction.natAuctionDataThe knapsack-auction data obtained from natural-number weights and capacity, with dummy zero allocation/payment rules. This is only used…
- SingleParameterMechanism.payment_formula_of_zeroNormalized_and_isDSICMyerson Lemma
(c): the unique zero-normalized DSIC payment rule from(b)is given by the explicit formula… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.PaymentInterimFubiniAssumptionsPayment-side Fubini hypotheses connecting ex-ante and interim expressions.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPaymentInterim expected payment
m_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.withPayment_isAllocFeasible_of_isSingleItemAllocationRuleA feasible single-item allocation rule satisfies
IsAllocFeasiblewith any payment rule. - SingleParameterMechanism.payment_sandwichFor a DSIC single-parameter mechanism, fixing all other bids yields the standard two-sided bound on payment differences.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalInEnvironmentAmongRevenueUpperBoundedRevenue optimality under the one-sided revenue upper bound.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule_isVirtualSurplusOptimalThe allocation rule of the constructed Bayesian single-item auction is virtual-surplus optimal.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsZeroNormalizedZero normalization for a Bayesian single-item auction's payment rule: reporting
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in /-- A single-parameter mechanism. Each agent `i` has a single private type `θ_i : R` (their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent a scalar `x_i : R` (typically in `[0, 1]`, interpreted as probability of winning or fractional quantity received). Payments are of the same scalar type `R`; utility is quasi-linear: `θ_i · x_i - p_i`. In practice `R = ℝ`. The structure is kept polymorphic for generality. This is the canonical setting for Myerson's revenue-optimal auction theorem and for characterizing implementable (DSIC) allocation rules via monotonicity. -/ structure SingleParameterMechanism (I : Type*) (R : Type*) extends MechanismWithTransfers I (fun _ => R) (I → R) R