AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

SingleParameterMechanism

structureimported Lean

A single-parameter mechanism. Each agent i has a single private type θ_i : R (their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent a scalar x_i : R (typically in [0, 1], interpreted as probability of winning or fractional quantity received). Payments are of the same scalar type R; utility is quasi-linear: θ_i · x_i - p_i. In practice R = ℝ. The structure is kept polymorphic for generality. This is the canonical setting for Myerson's revenue-optimal auction theorem and for characterizing implementable (DSIC) allocation rules via monotonicity.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
structure SingleParameterMechanism (I : Type*) (R : Type*)
    extends MechanismWithTransfers I (fun _ => R) (I → R) R
Defined in
EconCSLib, `SingleParameterMechanism`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 1
  • MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. - I — agents - T — report/type space of each agent - A — allocation space - P — payment space…
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set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
/-- A single-parameter mechanism. Each agent `i` has a single private type `θ_i : R` (their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent a scalar `x_i : R` (typically in `[0, 1]`, interpreted as probability of winning or fractional quantity received). Payments are of the same scalar type `R`; utility is quasi-linear: `θ_i · x_i - p_i`. In practice `R = ℝ`. The structure is kept polymorphic for generality. This is the canonical setting for Myerson's revenue-optimal auction theorem and for characterizing implementable (DSIC) allocation rules via monotonicity. -/
structure SingleParameterMechanism (I : Type*) (R : Type*)
    extends MechanismWithTransfers I (fun _ => R) (I → R) R
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