SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_isDSIC_of_isMonotone
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Myerson Lemma, Property 2: a monotone allocation rule is DSIC when paired with the canonical Myerson payment rule.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open SingleParameterMechanism in variable {I : Type*} in theorem SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_isDSIC_of_isMonotone [DecidableEq I] {x : (I → ℝ) → I → ℝ} (hx : IsMonotone ({ allocationRule := x, paymentRule := myersonPayment x } : SingleParameterMechanism I ℝ)) : (withMyersonPayment x).IsDSIC
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_isDSIC_of_isMonotone`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_isDSIC_of_isMonotone← SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_isDSIC_of_isMonotone (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Myerson.lean:162): adapted
What was changed in
SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_isDSIC_of_isMonotone--- EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Myerson.lean:162 (SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_isDSIC_of_isMonotone) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ -/-- Myerson Lemma, Property 2: -a monotone allocation rule is DSIC when paired with the canonical Myerson -payment rule. -/ -theorem withMyersonPayment_isDSIC_of_isMonotone [DecidableEq I] +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +open SingleParameterMechanism in +variable {I : Type*} in +theorem SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_isDSIC_of_isMonotone [DecidableEq I] {x : (I → ℝ) → I → ℝ} @@ -58,3 +59,3 @@ simpa [add_comm, add_left_comm, add_assoc] using - add_le_add_left hbracket (∫ z in 0..v i, g z) + add_le_add_right hbracket (∫ z in 0..v i, g z) _ = ∫ z in 0..v i, g z := by simp - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 15
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSICDominant-strategy incentive compatibility in the single-parameter, quasi-linear setting. Truthful reporting
θᵢis weakly dominant for… - SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_quasiLinearUtility_eqUtility under the canonical Myerson payment rule can be written in the standard envelope-friendly form.
- SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPaymentThe single-parameter mechanism obtained by equipping an allocation rule with its canonical Myerson payment rule.
- SingleParameterMechanism.quasiLinearUtilityQuasi-linear utility in the single-parameter setting:
uᵢ(θ, b) = θᵢ * xᵢ(b) - pᵢ(b). - SingleParameterMechanism.IsMonotoneMonotonicity of the allocation rule. Agent
i's allocation is non-decreasing ini's reported type, holding all other reports fixed.… - SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
ihas a single private typeθ_i : R(their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent… - MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - SingleParameterMechanism.myersonPaymentThe canonical Myerson payment formula associated with an allocation rule
x. Holding all other bids fixed, agentipays… - EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGameThe strategic game induced by a transfer mechanism and an external utility rule. Utility is supplied as a function of: - allocation -…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
G: each player picks a strategy. This is a dependent function∀ i, G.strategy i. The profile… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateUnilateral deviation in a game-bound profile: player
iswitches tos', while all other players keep their current strategies. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsDSICDominant-strategy incentive compatibility in the single-parameter, quasi-linear setting. Truthful reporting
- Used by 3
- SingleParameterMechanism.existsUnique_zeroNormalized_payment_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma
(b): ifxis monotone, then there is a unique zero-normalized payment rule making(x, p)DSIC. - SingleParameterMechanism.payment_formula_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalizedExplicit payment identity used in Myerson's Lemma: for a DSIC single-parameter mechanism with zero-normalized payments, the payment rule…
- SingleParameterMechanism.isImplementable_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma, Property 2, reformulated: an allocation rule is implementable if it is monotone.
- SingleParameterMechanism.existsUnique_zeroNormalized_payment_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen SingleParameterMechanism invariable {I : Type*} in/-- Myerson Lemma, Property 2: a monotone allocation rule is DSIC when paired with the canonical Myerson payment rule. -/theorem SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_isDSIC_of_isMonotone [DecidableEq I] {x : (I → ℝ) → I → ℝ} (hx : IsMonotone ({ allocationRule := x, paymentRule := myersonPayment x } : SingleParameterMechanism I ℝ)) : (withMyersonPayment x).IsDSIC := by intro v i (s' : ℝ) (reports : I → ℝ) let g : ℝ → ℝ := fun z => x (Function.update reports i z) i have hgmono : Monotone g := by intro z₁ z₂ hz exact hx i z₁ z₂ hz reports have hform : ∀ r : ℝ, (withMyersonPayment x).quasiLinearUtility (Function.update reports i r) v i = (v i - r) * g r + ∫ z in 0..r, g z := by intro r rw [withMyersonPayment_quasiLinearUtility_eq] simp [g, Function.update_idem] change (withMyersonPayment x).quasiLinearUtility (Function.update reports i s') v i ≤ (withMyersonPayment x).quasiLinearUtility (Function.update reports i (v i)) v i by_cases hs : s' ≤ v i · have hg0s : IntervalIntegrable g MeasureTheory.volume 0 s' := hgmono.intervalIntegrable have hgsv : IntervalIntegrable g MeasureTheory.volume s' (v i) := hgmono.intervalIntegrable have hmonoInt : (v i - s') * g s' ≤ ∫ z in s'..v i, g z := by simpa using intervalIntegral.integral_mono_on hs intervalIntegrable_const hgsv (fun z hz => hgmono hz.1) calc (withMyersonPayment x).quasiLinearUtility (Function.update reports i s') v i = (v i - s') * g s' + ∫ z in 0..s', g z := hform s' _ ≤ (∫ z in s'..v i, g z) + ∫ z in 0..s', g z := by exact add_le_add hmonoInt le_rfl _ = ∫ z in 0..v i, g z := by simpa [add_comm] using intervalIntegral.integral_add_adjacent_intervals hg0s hgsv _ = (withMyersonPayment x).quasiLinearUtility (Function.update reports i (v i)) v i := by rw [hform (v i)] ring · have hvs : v i ≤ s' := le_of_not_ge hs have hg0v : IntervalIntegrable g MeasureTheory.volume 0 (v i) := hgmono.intervalIntegrable have hgvs : IntervalIntegrable g MeasureTheory.volume (v i) s' := hgmono.intervalIntegrable have hbracket : (v i - s') * g s' + ∫ z in v i..s', g z ≤ 0 := by have hmonoInt : ∫ z in v i..s', g z ≤ (s' - v i) * g s' := by simpa using intervalIntegral.integral_mono_on hvs hgvs intervalIntegrable_const (fun z hz => hgmono hz.2) nlinarith calc (withMyersonPayment x).quasiLinearUtility (Function.update reports i s') v i = (v i - s') * g s' + ∫ z in 0..s', g z := hform s' _ = (v i - s') * g s' + ((∫ z in 0..v i, g z) + ∫ z in v i..s', g z) := by rw [← intervalIntegral.integral_add_adjacent_intervals hg0v hgvs] _ = (∫ z in 0..v i, g z) + ((v i - s') * g s' + ∫ z in v i..s', g z) := by ring _ ≤ ∫ z in 0..v i, g z + 0 := by simpa [add_comm, add_left_comm, add_assoc] using add_le_add_right hbracket (∫ z in 0..v i, g z) _ = ∫ z in 0..v i, g z := by simp _ = (withMyersonPayment x).quasiLinearUtility (Function.update reports i (v i)) v i := by rw [hform (v i)] ring