SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsAlphaMMS
defimported Lean
An allocation A is α-MMS if every agent receives at least α times their MMS value. IsAlphaMMS α v allGoods A ↔ ∀ i, α * mmsValue v allGoods i ≤ v.val i (A i). The scalar α : ℝ quantifies approximation quality: - α = 1: full MMS, equivalent to IsMaxminShare from Fairness.lean (see isMaxminShare_iff_isAlphaMMS_one). - α = 3/4: always achievable for additive valuations (see exists_isAlphaMMS_threefourths). - α = 0: trivially satisfied for nonneg valuations (see isAlphaMMS_zero). [Budish 2011; Amanatidis et al. 2017; Garg-Taki 2021]
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N G : Type*} in def SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsAlphaMMS [Fintype N] [DecidableEq G] (α : ℝ) (v : Valuation N G) (allGoods : Finset G) (A : Allocation N G) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsAlphaMMS`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsAlphaMMS← SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsAlphaMMS (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/FairDivision/Indivisible/MMS.lean:121): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 3
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
i : Na bundle (a finite subset of goodsG). This is a plain function type alias. The partition… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.ValuationAn abstract valuation assigns a real value to each agent-bundle pair.
val i Sis the value agentiassigns to bundleS. Lives in… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mmsValueThe maximin share (MMS) value of agent
iwith respect to valuationvand good setallGoods.…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
- Used by 4
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isMaxminShare_iff_isAlphaMMS_one
IsMaxminSharefromFairness.leancoincides withIsAlphaMMS 1. → direction (IsMaxminShare → IsAlphaMMS 1): for every complete… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isAlphaMMS_zeroEvery allocation trivially satisfies 0-MMS for nonneg valuations.
0 * mmsValue = 0 ≤ v_i(A_i)byzero_muland nonnegativity. - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsMaxminShare.isAlphaMMS
IsMaxminShareimplies α-MMS forα ≤ 1and nonneg MMS values. - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isAlphaMMS_mono_alphaα-MMS is monotone decreasing in α: if
Ais α-MMS andβ ≤ α, thenAis β-MMS. *Proof*:β * mmsValue ≤ α * mmsValue ≤ v_i(A_i)…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isMaxminShare_iff_isAlphaMMS_one
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N G : Type*} in /-- An allocation `A` is **α-MMS** if every agent receives at least `α` times their MMS value. `IsAlphaMMS α v allGoods A ↔ ∀ i, α * mmsValue v allGoods i ≤ v.val i (A i)`. The scalar `α : ℝ` quantifies approximation quality: - `α = 1`: full MMS, equivalent to `IsMaxminShare` from `Fairness.lean` (see `isMaxminShare_iff_isAlphaMMS_one`). - `α = 3/4`: always achievable for additive valuations (see `exists_isAlphaMMS_threefourths`). - `α = 0`: trivially satisfied for nonneg valuations (see `isAlphaMMS_zero`). [Budish 2011; Amanatidis et al. 2017; Garg-Taki 2021] -/ def SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsAlphaMMS [Fintype N] [DecidableEq G] (α : ℝ) (v : Valuation N G) (allGoods : Finset G) (A : Allocation N G) : Prop := ∀ i : N, α * mmsValue v allGoods i ≤ v.val i (A i)