AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsAlphaMMS

defimported Lean

An allocation A is α-MMS if every agent receives at least α times their MMS value. IsAlphaMMS α v allGoods A ↔ ∀ i, α * mmsValue v allGoods i ≤ v.val i (A i). The scalar α : ℝ quantifies approximation quality: - α = 1: full MMS, equivalent to IsMaxminShare from Fairness.lean (see isMaxminShare_iff_isAlphaMMS_one). - α = 3/4: always achievable for additive valuations (see exists_isAlphaMMS_threefourths). - α = 0: trivially satisfied for nonneg valuations (see isAlphaMMS_zero). [Budish 2011; Amanatidis et al. 2017; Garg-Taki 2021]

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset in
variable {N G : Type*} in
def SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsAlphaMMS [Fintype N] [DecidableEq G]
    (α : ℝ) (v : Valuation N G) (allGoods : Finset G) (A : Allocation N G) : Prop
Defined in
EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsAlphaMMS`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
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set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset in
variable {N G : Type*} in
/-- An allocation `A` is **α-MMS** if every agent receives at least `α` times their MMS value. `IsAlphaMMS α v allGoods A ↔ ∀ i, α * mmsValue v allGoods i ≤ v.val i (A i)`. The scalar `α : ℝ` quantifies approximation quality: - `α = 1`: full MMS, equivalent to `IsMaxminShare` from `Fairness.lean` (see `isMaxminShare_iff_isAlphaMMS_one`). - `α = 3/4`: always achievable for additive valuations (see `exists_isAlphaMMS_threefourths`). - `α = 0`: trivially satisfied for nonneg valuations (see `isAlphaMMS_zero`). [Budish 2011; Amanatidis et al. 2017; Garg-Taki 2021] -/
def SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsAlphaMMS [Fintype N] [DecidableEq G]
    (α : ℝ) (v : Valuation N G) (allGoods : Finset G) (A : Allocation N G) : Prop :=
  ∀ i : N, α * mmsValue v allGoods i ≤ v.val i (A i)
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