SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsMaxminShare.isAlphaMMS
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
IsMaxminShare implies α-MMS for α ≤ 1 and nonneg MMS values.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N G : Type*} in variable [Fintype N] [DecidableEq G] in theorem SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsMaxminShare.isAlphaMMS [Nonempty N] [Fintype G] (v : Valuation N G) (allGoods : Finset G) (A : Allocation N G) (hne : Nonempty {A' : Allocation N G // IsAllocation allGoods A'}) (hMMS : IsMaxminShare v allGoods A) (α : ℝ) (hα_le : α ≤ 1) (hmms_nn : ∀ i, 0 ≤ mmsValue v allGoods i) : IsAlphaMMS α v allGoods A
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsMaxminShare.isAlphaMMS`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsMaxminShare.isAlphaMMS← SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsMaxminShare.isAlphaMMS (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/FairDivision/Indivisible/MMS.lean:318): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 8
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
i : Na bundle (a finite subset of goodsG). This is a plain function type alias. The partition… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsAlphaMMSAn allocation
Ais α-MMS if every agent receives at leastαtimes their MMS value.… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isMaxminShare_iff_isAlphaMMS_one
IsMaxminSharefromFairness.leancoincides withIsAlphaMMS 1. → direction (IsMaxminShare → IsAlphaMMS 1): for every complete… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsAllocationA complete allocation partitions all goods among agents. *
disjoint: distinct agents receive disjoint bundles. *complete: every good… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isAlphaMMS_mono_alphaα-MMS is monotone decreasing in α: if
Ais α-MMS andβ ≤ α, thenAis β-MMS. *Proof*:β * mmsValue ≤ α * mmsValue ≤ v_i(A_i)… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsMaxminShareMaximin share (MMS) guarantee: each agent's bundle is at least as valuable as their maximin share value — the best worst-piece they could…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.ValuationAn abstract valuation assigns a real value to each agent-bundle pair.
val i Sis the value agentiassigns to bundleS. Lives in… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mmsValueThe maximin share (MMS) value of agent
iwith respect to valuationvand good setallGoods.…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N G : Type*} in variable [Fintype N] [DecidableEq G] in /-- **`IsMaxminShare` implies α-MMS** for `α ≤ 1` and nonneg MMS values. -/ theorem SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsMaxminShare.isAlphaMMS [Nonempty N] [Fintype G] (v : Valuation N G) (allGoods : Finset G) (A : Allocation N G) (hne : Nonempty {A' : Allocation N G // IsAllocation allGoods A'}) (hMMS : IsMaxminShare v allGoods A) (α : ℝ) (hα_le : α ≤ 1) (hmms_nn : ∀ i, 0 ≤ mmsValue v allGoods i) : IsAlphaMMS α v allGoods A := isAlphaMMS_mono_alpha v allGoods A 1 α hα_le hmms_nn ((isMaxminShare_iff_isAlphaMMS_one v allGoods A hne).mp hMMS)