SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isAlphaMMS_zero
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Every allocation trivially satisfies 0-MMS for nonneg valuations. 0 * mmsValue = 0 ≤ v_i(A_i) by zero_mul and nonnegativity.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N G : Type*} in variable [Fintype N] [DecidableEq G] in theorem SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isAlphaMMS_zero (v : Valuation N G) (allGoods : Finset G) (A : Allocation N G) (hnonneg : ∀ i S, 0 ≤ v.val i S) : IsAlphaMMS 0 v allGoods A
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isAlphaMMS_zero`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isAlphaMMS_zero← SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isAlphaMMS_zero (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/FairDivision/Indivisible/MMS.lean:308): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 4
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
i : Na bundle (a finite subset of goodsG). This is a plain function type alias. The partition… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsAlphaMMSAn allocation
Ais α-MMS if every agent receives at leastαtimes their MMS value.… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.ValuationAn abstract valuation assigns a real value to each agent-bundle pair.
val i Sis the value agentiassigns to bundleS. Lives in… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mmsValueThe maximin share (MMS) value of agent
iwith respect to valuationvand good setallGoods.…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen Finset invariable {N G : Type*} invariable [Fintype N] [DecidableEq G] in/-- Every allocation trivially satisfies **0-MMS** for nonneg valuations. `0 * mmsValue = 0 ≤ v_i(A_i)` by `zero_mul` and nonnegativity. -/theorem SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isAlphaMMS_zero (v : Valuation N G) (allGoods : Finset G) (A : Allocation N G) (hnonneg : ∀ i S, 0 ≤ v.val i S) : IsAlphaMMS 0 v allGoods A := by intro i show 0 * mmsValue v allGoods i ≤ v.val i (A i) rw [zero_mul] exact hnonneg i (A i)