SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isAlphaMMS_mono_alpha
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
α-MMS is monotone decreasing in α: if A is α-MMS and β ≤ α, then A is β-MMS. *Proof*: β * mmsValue ≤ α * mmsValue ≤ v_i(A_i) since β ≤ α and mmsValue ≥ 0.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N G : Type*} in variable [Fintype N] [DecidableEq G] in theorem SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isAlphaMMS_mono_alpha (v : Valuation N G) (allGoods : Finset G) (A : Allocation N G) (α β : ℝ) (hβα : β ≤ α) (hmms_nn : ∀ i, 0 ≤ mmsValue v allGoods i) (hα : IsAlphaMMS α v allGoods A) : IsAlphaMMS β v allGoods A
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isAlphaMMS_mono_alpha`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isAlphaMMS_mono_alpha← SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isAlphaMMS_mono_alpha (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/FairDivision/Indivisible/MMS.lean:294): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 4
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
i : Na bundle (a finite subset of goodsG). This is a plain function type alias. The partition… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsAlphaMMSAn allocation
Ais α-MMS if every agent receives at leastαtimes their MMS value.… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.ValuationAn abstract valuation assigns a real value to each agent-bundle pair.
val i Sis the value agentiassigns to bundleS. Lives in… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.mmsValueThe maximin share (MMS) value of agent
iwith respect to valuationvand good setallGoods.…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
- Used by 1
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsMaxminShare.isAlphaMMS
IsMaxminShareimplies α-MMS forα ≤ 1and nonneg MMS values.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsMaxminShare.isAlphaMMS
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen Finset invariable {N G : Type*} invariable [Fintype N] [DecidableEq G] in/-- **α-MMS is monotone decreasing in α**: if `A` is α-MMS and `β ≤ α`, then `A` is β-MMS. *Proof*: `β * mmsValue ≤ α * mmsValue ≤ v_i(A_i)` since `β ≤ α` and `mmsValue ≥ 0`. -/theorem SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.isAlphaMMS_mono_alpha (v : Valuation N G) (allGoods : Finset G) (A : Allocation N G) (α β : ℝ) (hβα : β ≤ α) (hmms_nn : ∀ i, 0 ≤ mmsValue v allGoods i) (hα : IsAlphaMMS α v allGoods A) : IsAlphaMMS β v allGoods A := by intro i calc β * mmsValue v allGoods i ≤ α * mmsValue v allGoods i := mul_le_mul_of_nonneg_right hβα (hmms_nn i) _ ≤ v.val i (A i) := hα i