AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

SocialChoice.Voting.Dictatorial

defimported Lean

A rule is dictatorial if one voter always gets their top-ranked alternative as the unique winner.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset in
variable {N A : Type*} in
variable [Fintype N] [Fintype A] in
def SocialChoice.Voting.Dictatorial [Nonempty A] (f : VotingRule N A) : Prop
Defined in
EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.Dictatorial`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
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set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset in
variable {N A : Type*} in
variable [Fintype N] [Fintype A] in
/-- A rule is dictatorial if one voter always gets their top-ranked alternative as the unique winner. -/
def SocialChoice.Voting.Dictatorial [Nonempty A] (f : VotingRule N A) : Prop :=
  ∃ i : N, ∀ P : Profile N A, f P = {topChoice P i}
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