SocialChoice.Voting.Dictatorial
defimported Lean
A rule is dictatorial if one voter always gets their top-ranked alternative as the unique winner.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in variable [Fintype N] [Fintype A] in def SocialChoice.Voting.Dictatorial [Nonempty A] (f : VotingRule N A) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.Dictatorial`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.Dictatorial← SocialChoice.Voting.Dictatorial (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Basic.lean:329): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 3
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- SocialChoice.Voting.VotingRuleA set-valued voting rule on fixed finite voter and candidate types.
- SocialChoice.Voting.topChoiceThe top-ranked alternative of voter
i.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in variable [Fintype N] [Fintype A] in /-- A rule is dictatorial if one voter always gets their top-ranked alternative as the unique winner. -/ def SocialChoice.Voting.Dictatorial [Nonempty A] (f : VotingRule N A) : Prop := ∃ i : N, ∀ P : Profile N A, f P = {topChoice P i}