SocialChoice.Voting.topChoice
defimported Lean
The top-ranked alternative of voter i.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in noncomputable def SocialChoice.Voting.topChoice [Fintype N] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] (P : Profile N A) (i : N) : A
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.topChoice`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.topChoice← SocialChoice.Voting.topChoice (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Basic.lean:147): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- Used by 3
- SocialChoice.Voting.topRank_eq_topChoiceSocialChoice.Voting.topRank_eq_topChoice
- SocialChoice.Voting.DictatorialA rule is dictatorial if one voter always gets their top-ranked alternative as the unique winner.
- SocialChoice.Voting.topChoice_topRankSocialChoice.Voting.topChoice_topRank
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in /-- The top-ranked alternative of voter `i`. -/ noncomputable def SocialChoice.Voting.topChoice [Fintype N] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] (P : Profile N A) (i : N) : A := by classical letI := P.pref i exact Finset.min' Finset.univ Finset.univ_nonempty