SocialChoice.Voting.PessimistStrategyproofness
defimported Lean
Pessimist strategyproofness for set-valued rules.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in variable [Fintype N] [Fintype A] in def SocialChoice.Voting.PessimistStrategyproofness (f : VotingRule N A) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.PessimistStrategyproofness`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.PessimistStrategyproofness← SocialChoice.Voting.PessimistStrategyproofness (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Basic.lean:323): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 5
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.PrefersVoter
istrictly prefersatobin profileP. - SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- SocialChoice.Voting.updateProfileReplace one voter's ballot.
- SocialChoice.Voting.VotingRuleA set-valued voting rule on fixed finite voter and candidate types.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in variable [Fintype N] [Fintype A] in /-- Pessimist strategyproofness for set-valued rules. -/ def SocialChoice.Voting.PessimistStrategyproofness (f : VotingRule N A) : Prop := ∀ (P : Profile N A) (i : N) (r : LinearOrder A), ¬ ∃ a ∈ f P, ∀ b ∈ f (updateProfile P i r), Prefers P i b a