SocialChoice.Voting.ParetoEfficiency
abbrevimported Lean
Alias for voting-rule unanimity in its weak-Pareto form.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in variable [Fintype N] [Fintype A] in abbrev SocialChoice.Voting.ParetoEfficiency (f : VotingRule N A) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.ParetoEfficiency`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.ParetoEfficiency← SocialChoice.Voting.ParetoEfficiency (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Basic.lean:263): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 3
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.UnanimityUnanimity/Pareto for set-valued voting rules: no unanimously dominated alternative is selected.
- SocialChoice.Voting.VotingRuleA set-valued voting rule on fixed finite voter and candidate types.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in variable [Fintype N] [Fintype A] in /-- Alias for voting-rule unanimity in its weak-Pareto form. -/ abbrev SocialChoice.Voting.ParetoEfficiency (f : VotingRule N A) : Prop := Unanimity f