SocialChoice.Voting.Unanimity
defimported Lean
Unanimity/Pareto for set-valued voting rules: no unanimously dominated alternative is selected.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in variable [Fintype N] [Fintype A] in def SocialChoice.Voting.Unanimity (f : VotingRule N A) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.Unanimity`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.Unanimity← SocialChoice.Voting.Unanimity (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Basic.lean:259): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 4
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.PrefersVoter
istrictly prefersatobin profileP. - SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- SocialChoice.Voting.VotingRuleA set-valued voting rule on fixed finite voter and candidate types.
- Used by 3
- SocialChoice.Voting.unanimous_strict_pref_not_chosenIf every voter strictly prefers
atob, then a unanimous monotonic resolute voting rule cannot chooseb. This is the set-valued… - SocialChoice.Voting.ParetoEfficiencyAlias for voting-rule unanimity in its weak-Pareto form.
- SocialChoice.Voting.top_unanimity_of_unanimityTop unanimity follows from weak-Pareto unanimity plus totality: if every voter ranks
afirst, thenais the unique winner.
- SocialChoice.Voting.unanimous_strict_pref_not_chosenIf every voter strictly prefers
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in variable [Fintype N] [Fintype A] in /-- Unanimity/Pareto for set-valued voting rules: no unanimously dominated alternative is selected. -/ def SocialChoice.Voting.Unanimity (f : VotingRule N A) : Prop := ∀ (P : Profile N A) (a b : A), (∀ i : N, Prefers P i a b) → b ∉ f P