AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

SocialChoice.Voting.top_unanimity_of_unanimity

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

Top unanimity follows from weak-Pareto unanimity plus totality: if every voter ranks a first, then a is the unique winner.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset in
variable {N A : Type*} in
variable [Fintype N] [Fintype A] in
theorem SocialChoice.Voting.top_unanimity_of_unanimity [Nonempty A] {f : VotingRule N A}
    (hf : IsTotal f) (hU : Unanimity f) :
    ∀ (P : Profile N A) (a : A), (∀ i : N, TopRank P i a) → f P = {a}
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.top_unanimity_of_unanimity`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 6

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen Finset invariable {N A : Type*} invariable [Fintype N] [Fintype A] in/-- Top unanimity follows from weak-Pareto unanimity plus totality: if every voter ranks `a` first, then `a` is the unique winner. -/theorem SocialChoice.Voting.top_unanimity_of_unanimity [Nonempty A] {f : VotingRule N A}    (hf : IsTotal f) (hU : Unanimity f) :    ∀ (P : Profile N A) (a : A), (∀ i : N, TopRank P i a) → f P = {a} := by  intro P a ha  apply Finset.eq_singleton_iff_unique_mem.mpr  refine ⟨?_, ?_⟩  · by_contra hnot    rcases hf P with ⟨b, hb⟩    have hba : b = a := by      by_contra hne      exact hU P a b (fun i => ha i b hne) hb    exact hnot (by simpa [hba] using hb)  · intro b hb    by_contra hne    exact hU P a b (fun i => ha i b hne) hb
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