SocialChoice.Voting.top_unanimity_of_unanimity
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Top unanimity follows from weak-Pareto unanimity plus totality: if every voter ranks a first, then a is the unique winner.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in variable [Fintype N] [Fintype A] in theorem SocialChoice.Voting.top_unanimity_of_unanimity [Nonempty A] {f : VotingRule N A} (hf : IsTotal f) (hU : Unanimity f) : ∀ (P : Profile N A) (a : A), (∀ i : N, TopRank P i a) → f P = {a}
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.top_unanimity_of_unanimity`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.top_unanimity_of_unanimity← SocialChoice.Voting.top_unanimity_of_unanimity (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Basic.lean:268): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 6
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- SocialChoice.Voting.TopRankCandidate
ais top-ranked by voteri. - SocialChoice.Voting.UnanimityUnanimity/Pareto for set-valued voting rules: no unanimously dominated alternative is selected.
- SocialChoice.Voting.IsTotalA voting rule is total if it always returns at least one winner.
- SocialChoice.Voting.VotingRuleA set-valued voting rule on fixed finite voter and candidate types.
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen Finset invariable {N A : Type*} invariable [Fintype N] [Fintype A] in/-- Top unanimity follows from weak-Pareto unanimity plus totality: if every voter ranks `a` first, then `a` is the unique winner. -/theorem SocialChoice.Voting.top_unanimity_of_unanimity [Nonempty A] {f : VotingRule N A} (hf : IsTotal f) (hU : Unanimity f) : ∀ (P : Profile N A) (a : A), (∀ i : N, TopRank P i a) → f P = {a} := by intro P a ha apply Finset.eq_singleton_iff_unique_mem.mpr refine ⟨?_, ?_⟩ · by_contra hnot rcases hf P with ⟨b, hb⟩ have hba : b = a := by by_contra hne exact hU P a b (fun i => ha i b hne) hb exact hnot (by simpa [hba] using hb) · intro b hb by_contra hne exact hU P a b (fun i => ha i b hne) hb