SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.asymm
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.asymm
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in theorem SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.asymm [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (P : Profile N A) (i : N) {a b : A} : Prefers P i a b → ¬ Prefers P i b a
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.asymm`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.asymm← SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.asymm (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Basic.lean:122): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 4
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.PrefersVoter
istrictly prefersatobin profileP. - SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers.asymmSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers.asymm
- Used by 2
- SocialChoice.Voting.modifiedForwardProfile_specSocialChoice.Voting.modifiedForwardProfile_spec
- SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_for_reflSocialChoice.Voting.decisive_for_refl
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in theorem SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.asymm [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (P : Profile N A) (i : N) {a b : A} : Prefers P i a b → ¬ Prefers P i b a := BallotPrefers.asymm (P.pref i)