SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_for_refl
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_for_refl
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N A : Type*} in theorem SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_for_refl [Fintype N] [Fintype A] {F : SWF N A} {C : Set N} (hC : Set.Nonempty C) (x : A) : IsDecisiveFor F C x x
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_for_refl`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_for_refl← SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_for_refl (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Decisive.lean:467): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 9
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.PrefersVoter
istrictly prefersatobin profileP. - strictStrict preference derived from a weak preference relation.
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.asymmSocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.asymm
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWFA social welfare function maps strict profiles to a weak social preference.
- SocialChoice.Voting.IsDecisiveForA coalition is decisive for
aoverbif unanimous strict support inside the coalition forces the social strict preferencea ≻ b. - PrefA bundled weak preference relation. Use this interface when several agents may rank the same outcome type differently. Use…
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {N A : Type*} intheorem SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_for_refl [Fintype N] [Fintype A] {F : SWF N A} {C : Set N} (hC : Set.Nonempty C) (x : A) : IsDecisiveFor F C x x := by intro P hP rcases hC with ⟨i, hi⟩ exact False.elim ((Prefers.asymm P i (hP i hi)) (hP i hi))