SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers
defimported Lean
Voter i strictly prefers a to b in profile P.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in def SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (P : Profile N A) (i : N) (a b : A) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers← SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Basic.lean:119): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 3
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefersBallot
rranksastrictly aboveb. - SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefersBallot
- Used by 30
- SocialChoice.Voting.votersPreferringVoters who strictly prefer
atob. - SocialChoice.Voting.topRank_eq_topChoiceSocialChoice.Voting.topRank_eq_topChoice
- SocialChoice.Voting.PessimistStrategyproofnessPessimist strategyproofness for set-valued rules.
- SocialChoice.Voting.condorcetProfile_specSocialChoice.Voting.condorcetProfile_spec
- SocialChoice.Voting.unanimity_univ_isDecisiveSocialChoice.Voting.unanimity_univ_isDecisive
- SocialChoice.Voting.iia_strictSocialChoice.Voting.iia_strict
- SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.total_of_neSocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.total_of_ne
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.IIAIndependence of irrelevant alternatives for SWFs.
- SocialChoice.Voting.modifiedForwardProfile_specSocialChoice.Voting.modifiedForwardProfile_spec
- SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choiceSocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choice
- SocialChoice.Voting.ResoluteStrategyproofnessStrategyproofness for resolute rules: changing one ballot cannot produce a strictly better unique winner for the deviating voter.
- SocialChoice.Voting.TopRankCandidate
ais top-ranked by voteri. - SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.asymmSocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.asymm
- SocialChoice.Voting.SimpleLift
Qis obtained fromPby weakly raisinga: anything belowainPremains belowainQ, and anything aboveainQwas… - SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forwardSocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forward
- SocialChoice.Voting.UnanimityUnanimity/Pareto for set-valued voting rules: no unanimously dominated alternative is selected.
- SocialChoice.Voting.unanimous_strict_pref_not_chosenIf every voter strictly prefers
atob, then a unanimous monotonic resolute voting rule cannot chooseb. This is the set-valued… - SocialChoice.Voting.margin_selfSocialChoice.Voting.margin_self
- SocialChoice.Voting.OptimistStrategyproofnessOptimist strategyproofness for set-valued rules.
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.UnanimityUnanimity/Pareto for SWFs: unanimous strict preference forces social strict preference.
- SocialChoice.Voting.prefers_transSocialChoice.Voting.prefers_trans
- SocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_isDictatorSocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_isDictator
- SocialChoice.Voting.isWeaklyDecisiveFor_of_isDecisiveForSocialChoice.Voting.isWeaklyDecisiveFor_of_isDecisiveFor
- SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_for_reflSocialChoice.Voting.decisive_for_refl
- SocialChoice.Voting.BottomRankCandidate
ais bottom-ranked by voteri. - SocialChoice.Voting.IsDecisiveForA coalition is decisive for
aoverbif unanimous strict support inside the coalition forces the social strict preferencea ≻ b. - SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.DictatorialA SWF is dictatorial if one voter always determines every strict social comparison.
- SocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_dictatorialSocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_dictatorial
- SocialChoice.Voting.topChoice_topRankSocialChoice.Voting.topChoice_topRank
- SocialChoice.Voting.IsWeaklyDecisiveForWeak decisiveness tests a coalition against a complement unanimously supporting the opposite strict ranking.
- SocialChoice.Voting.votersPreferringVoters who strictly prefer
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in /-- Voter `i` strictly prefers `a` to `b` in profile `P`. -/ def SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (P : Profile N A) (i : N) (a b : A) : Prop := BallotPrefers (P.pref i) a b