SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.total_of_ne
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.total_of_ne
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in theorem SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.total_of_ne [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (P : Profile N A) (i : N) {a b : A} (hne : a ≠ b) : Prefers P i a b ∨ Prefers P i b a
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.total_of_ne`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.total_of_ne← SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.total_of_ne (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Basic.lean:126): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 4
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.PrefersVoter
istrictly prefersatobin profileP. - SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers.total_of_neSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers.total_of_ne
- Used by 1
- SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choiceSocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choice
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in theorem SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.total_of_ne [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (P : Profile N A) (i : N) {a b : A} (hne : a ≠ b) : Prefers P i a b ∨ Prefers P i b a := BallotPrefers.total_of_ne (P.pref i) hne