SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choice
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choice
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N A : Type*} in theorem SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choice [Fintype N] [DecidableEq N] [Fintype A] (f : VotingRule N A) (hf_res : Resolute f) (hSP : ResoluteStrategyproofness f hf_res) {P Q : Profile N A} {a : A} (hLift : SimpleLift Q P a) {S : Finset N} {i : N} (hi : i ∉ S) (ha : a ∈ f (hybridProfile P Q S)) : a ∈ f (hybridProfile P Q (insert i S))
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choice`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choice← SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choice (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/GibbardSatterthwaite.lean:118): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 14
- SocialChoice.Voting.ResoluteA voting rule is resolute if it always returns exactly one winner.
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefersBallot
rranksastrictly aboveb. - SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.PrefersVoter
istrictly prefersatobin profileP. - SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.total_of_neSocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.total_of_ne
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- SocialChoice.Voting.ResoluteStrategyproofnessStrategyproofness for resolute rules: changing one ballot cannot produce a strictly better unique winner for the deviating voter.
- SocialChoice.Voting.updateProfileReplace one voter's ballot.
- SocialChoice.Voting.SimpleLift
Qis obtained fromPby weakly raisinga: anything belowainPremains belowainQ, and anything aboveainQwas… - SocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfile_erase_eq_updateSocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfile_erase_eq_update
- SocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfile_insert_eq_updateSocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfile_insert_eq_update
- SocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfileSocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfile
- SocialChoice.Voting.VotingRuleA set-valued voting rule on fixed finite voter and candidate types.
- SocialChoice.Voting.resolute_eq_singleton_of_memSocialChoice.Voting.resolute_eq_singleton_of_mem
- Used by 1
- SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_monotonicStrategy-proofness implies monotonicity for finite voter sets. [MSZ 21.35]
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {N A : Type*} intheorem SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choice [Fintype N] [DecidableEq N] [Fintype A] (f : VotingRule N A) (hf_res : Resolute f) (hSP : ResoluteStrategyproofness f hf_res) {P Q : Profile N A} {a : A} (hLift : SimpleLift Q P a) {S : Finset N} {i : N} (hi : i ∉ S) (ha : a ∈ f (hybridProfile P Q S)) : a ∈ f (hybridProfile P Q (insert i S)) := by classical by_contra hnot let H0 := hybridProfile P Q S let H1 := hybridProfile P Q (insert i S) have hf0 : f H0 = {a} := resolute_eq_singleton_of_mem hf_res ha rcases Finset.card_eq_one.mp (hf_res H1) with ⟨b, hb⟩ have hbmem : b ∈ f H1 := by simp [hb] have hba : b ≠ a := by intro h exact hnot (by simpa [h] using hbmem) have hforward : ¬ Prefers H0 i b a := by have hupdate : f (updateProfile H0 i (Q.pref i)) = {b} := by rw [← hybridProfile_insert_eq_update P Q S hi] exact hb exact hSP H0 i (Q.pref i) a b hf0 hupdate have hreverse : ¬ Prefers H1 i a b := by have hupdate : f (updateProfile H1 i (P.pref i)) = {a} := by rw [← hybridProfile_erase_eq_update P Q S hi] exact hf0 exact hSP H1 i (P.pref i) b a hb hupdate have hP_or := Prefers.total_of_ne P i (Ne.symm hba) cases hP_or with | inl hPab => have hQab := (hLift i b).left hPab have hH1ab : Prefers H1 i a b := by simpa [H1, hybridProfile, Prefers] using hQab exact hreverse hH1ab | inr hPba => have hH0ba : Prefers H0 i b a := by simpa [H0, hybridProfile, Prefers, hi] using hPba exact hforward hH0ba