SocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfile
defimported Lean
SocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfile
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N A : Type*} in @[reducible] noncomputable def SocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfile [Fintype N] [DecidableEq N] [Fintype A] (P Q : Profile N A) (S : Finset N) : Profile N A
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfile`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfile← SocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfile (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/GibbardSatterthwaite.lean:84): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- Used by 4
- SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choiceSocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choice
- SocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfile_erase_eq_updateSocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfile_erase_eq_update
- SocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfile_insert_eq_updateSocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfile_insert_eq_update
- SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_monotonicStrategy-proofness implies monotonicity for finite voter sets. [MSZ 21.35]
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N A : Type*} in @[reducible] noncomputable def SocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfile [Fintype N] [DecidableEq N] [Fintype A] (P Q : Profile N A) (S : Finset N) : Profile N A where pref := fun i => if i ∈ S then Q.pref i else P.pref i