AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_monotonic

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

Strategy-proofness implies monotonicity for finite voter sets. [MSZ 21.35]

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {N A : Type*} in
theorem SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_monotonic [Fintype N] [Fintype A]
    (f : VotingRule N A) (hf_res : Resolute f)
    (hSP : ResoluteStrategyproofness f hf_res) :
    Monotonicity f
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_monotonic`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 9

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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {N A : Type*} in/-- Strategy-proofness implies monotonicity for finite voter sets. [MSZ 21.35] -/theorem SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_monotonic [Fintype N] [Fintype A]    (f : VotingRule N A) (hf_res : Resolute f)    (hSP : ResoluteStrategyproofness f hf_res) :    Monotonicity f := by  classical  intro P Q a ha hLift  have hAll : ∀ S : Finset N, a ∈ f (hybridProfile P Q S) := by    intro S    induction S using Finset.induction_on with    | empty =>        simpa [hybridProfile] using ha    | insert i S hi ih =>        exact strategyproof_insert_preserves_choice f hf_res hSP hLift hi ih  simpa [hybridProfile] using hAll (Finset.univ : Finset N)
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