SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_monotonic
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Strategy-proofness implies monotonicity for finite voter sets. [MSZ 21.35]
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N A : Type*} in theorem SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_monotonic [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (f : VotingRule N A) (hf_res : Resolute f) (hSP : ResoluteStrategyproofness f hf_res) : Monotonicity f
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_monotonic`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_monotonic← SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_monotonic (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/GibbardSatterthwaite.lean:476): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 9
- SocialChoice.Voting.ResoluteA voting rule is resolute if it always returns exactly one winner.
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.MonotonicityMonotonicity: raising a selected alternative cannot make it unselected.
- SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choiceSocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choice
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- SocialChoice.Voting.ResoluteStrategyproofnessStrategyproofness for resolute rules: changing one ballot cannot produce a strictly better unique winner for the deviating voter.
- SocialChoice.Voting.SimpleLift
Qis obtained fromPby weakly raisinga: anything belowainPremains belowainQ, and anything aboveainQwas… - SocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfileSocialChoice.Voting.hybridProfile
- SocialChoice.Voting.VotingRuleA set-valued voting rule on fixed finite voter and candidate types.
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {N A : Type*} in/-- Strategy-proofness implies monotonicity for finite voter sets. [MSZ 21.35] -/theorem SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_monotonic [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (f : VotingRule N A) (hf_res : Resolute f) (hSP : ResoluteStrategyproofness f hf_res) : Monotonicity f := by classical intro P Q a ha hLift have hAll : ∀ S : Finset N, a ∈ f (hybridProfile P Q S) := by intro S induction S using Finset.induction_on with | empty => simpa [hybridProfile] using ha | insert i S hi ih => exact strategyproof_insert_preserves_choice f hf_res hSP hLift hi ih simpa [hybridProfile] using hAll (Finset.univ : Finset N)