SocialChoice.Voting.resolute_eq_singleton_of_mem
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
SocialChoice.Voting.resolute_eq_singleton_of_mem
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N A : Type*} in theorem SocialChoice.Voting.resolute_eq_singleton_of_mem [Fintype N] [Fintype A] {f : VotingRule N A} (hf_res : Resolute f) {P : Profile N A} {a : A} (ha : a ∈ f P) : f P = {a}
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.resolute_eq_singleton_of_mem`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.resolute_eq_singleton_of_mem← SocialChoice.Voting.resolute_eq_singleton_of_mem (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/GibbardSatterthwaite.lean:88): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 3
- SocialChoice.Voting.ResoluteA voting rule is resolute if it always returns exactly one winner.
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- SocialChoice.Voting.VotingRuleA set-valued voting rule on fixed finite voter and candidate types.
- Used by 1
- SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choiceSocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choice
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {N A : Type*} intheorem SocialChoice.Voting.resolute_eq_singleton_of_mem [Fintype N] [Fintype A] {f : VotingRule N A} (hf_res : Resolute f) {P : Profile N A} {a : A} (ha : a ∈ f P) : f P = {a} := by rcases Finset.card_eq_one.mp (hf_res P) with ⟨b, hb⟩ have hba : a = b := by simpa [hb] using ha simp [hb, hba]