AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

SocialChoice.Voting.resolute_eq_singleton_of_mem

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

SocialChoice.Voting.resolute_eq_singleton_of_mem

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {N A : Type*} in
theorem SocialChoice.Voting.resolute_eq_singleton_of_mem [Fintype N] [Fintype A]
    {f : VotingRule N A} (hf_res : Resolute f) {P : Profile N A} {a : A}
    (ha : a ∈ f P) : f P = {a}
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.resolute_eq_singleton_of_mem`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 3
Used by 1

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {N A : Type*} intheorem SocialChoice.Voting.resolute_eq_singleton_of_mem [Fintype N] [Fintype A]    {f : VotingRule N A} (hf_res : Resolute f) {P : Profile N A} {a : A}    (ha : a ∈ f P) : f P = {a} := by  rcases Finset.card_eq_one.mp (hf_res P) with ⟨b, hb⟩  have hba : a = b := by    simpa [hb] using ha  simp [hb, hba]
See it in the graphDiscuss this resultChallenge it