SocialChoice.Voting.topRank_eq_topChoice
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
SocialChoice.Voting.topRank_eq_topChoice
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in theorem SocialChoice.Voting.topRank_eq_topChoice [Fintype N] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] (P : Profile N A) (i : N) (a : A) (ha : TopRank P i a) : a = topChoice P i
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.topRank_eq_topChoice`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.topRank_eq_topChoice← SocialChoice.Voting.topRank_eq_topChoice (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Basic.lean:161): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 8
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.PrefersVoter
istrictly prefersatobin profileP. - TotalPreorderA total preorder: a preorder where
≤is total (complete). This is weaker thanLinearOrder— it does NOT require antisymmetry or… - SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- SocialChoice.Voting.TopRankCandidate
ais top-ranked by voteri. - LinearOrder.toTotalPreorderEvery
LinearOrderis aTotalPreorder. - SocialChoice.Voting.topChoiceThe top-ranked alternative of voter
i. - SocialChoice.Voting.topChoice_topRankSocialChoice.Voting.topChoice_topRank
Lean source view module on GitHub
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen Finset invariable {N A : Type*} intheorem SocialChoice.Voting.topRank_eq_topChoice [Fintype N] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] (P : Profile N A) (i : N) (a : A) (ha : TopRank P i a) : a = topChoice P i := by by_contra hne have h₁ := ha (topChoice P i) (Ne.symm hne) have h₂ := topChoice_topRank P i a hne letI := P.pref i exact (lt_asymm h₁ h₂).elim