SocialChoice.Voting.topChoice_topRank
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
SocialChoice.Voting.topChoice_topRank
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in theorem SocialChoice.Voting.topChoice_topRank [Fintype N] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] (P : Profile N A) (i : N) : TopRank P i (topChoice P i)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.topChoice_topRank`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.topChoice_topRank← SocialChoice.Voting.topChoice_topRank (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Basic.lean:153): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 5
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.PrefersVoter
istrictly prefersatobin profileP. - SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- SocialChoice.Voting.TopRankCandidate
ais top-ranked by voteri. - SocialChoice.Voting.topChoiceThe top-ranked alternative of voter
i.
- Used by 1
- SocialChoice.Voting.topRank_eq_topChoiceSocialChoice.Voting.topRank_eq_topChoice
Lean source view module on GitHub
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen Finset invariable {N A : Type*} intheorem SocialChoice.Voting.topChoice_topRank [Fintype N] [Fintype A] [Nonempty A] (P : Profile N A) (i : N) : TopRank P i (topChoice P i) := by classical intro b hb unfold topChoice Prefers letI := P.pref i exact lt_of_le_of_ne (Finset.min'_le Finset.univ b (by simp)) (Ne.symm hb)