proportional_share_alloc
deforiginal
Proportional-share allocation: identity j receives the fraction b_j / W of the work, W being the total bid.
Statement
noncomputable def proportional_share_alloc (bids : List ℝ) (j : ℕ) : ℝ
- Related work
- operator (Claude), 2026-10-03: answer to the open question of arXiv:2603.27779 v1, Sec. 6 (is there a procurement mechanism that is Sybil-proof and ex-post safe with non-winner-take-all equilibria?): yes, the stake-share mechanism (work and a pool L + K max(0, M - W) shared in proportion to free stakes) is Sybil-proof, ex-post safe for costs up to L, and all its PNE give work to at least two agents; ex-post safety for all costs is impossible together with PNE in this proportional-share class
- Verified
- 03 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 11
- proportional_share_no_pne_of_safe_all_costsIf a proportional-share mechanism is ex-post safe for every nonnegative cost, then no profile with at least one agent and nonnegative…
- proportional_share_payProportional-share payment with total pool pool(W): identity j is paid its work share times pool(W).
- proportional_share_sybil_proofEvery proportional-share mechanism is Sybil-proof: a single bid equal to the sum of an agent's bids gives the same utility.
- proportional_share_allocation_eqIn a proportional-share mechanism an agent's total work is s / (s + R), s its total bid and R the others' total.
- exists_sybil_proof_ex_post_safe_non_winner_take_all_procurementThere is a procurement mechanism that is Sybil-proof, ex-post safe for all costs at most 1, whose pure Nash equilibria (for costs at most…
- stake_share_pne_exists_and_non_winner_take_allFor n >= 2 agents with costs in [0, L] and K M >= 3 n^2 L, the stake-share mechanism has a pure Nash equilibrium, and every pure Nash…
- stake_share_pne_existsFor n >= 2 agents with costs in [0, L], if K M >= 3 n^2 L then the stake-share mechanism has a pure Nash equilibrium (each agent…
- stake_share_pne_non_winner_take_allIn the stake-share mechanism with K, M > 0 and all costs at most L, every pure Nash equilibrium (with at least one agent) gives positive…
- proportional_share_utility_eqIn a proportional-share mechanism an agent's utility is s / (s + R) times (pool(s + R) - c).
- stake_share_two_agent_pneWith pool 1 + max(0, 2 - W) and costs 1/5 and 9/10, the stakes 24/35 and 18/35 form a pure Nash equilibrium.
- stake_share_ex_post_safeWith K > 0 and M > 0, the stake-share mechanism is ex-post safe for every agent whose cost is at most L.
Lean source view module on GitHub
noncomputable def proportional_share_alloc (bids : List ℝ) (j : ℕ) : ℝ := bids.getD j 0 / bids.sum