AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

proportional_share_utility_eq

lemmaverified

In a proportional-share mechanism an agent's utility is s / (s + R) times (pool(s + R) - c).

Statement

lemma proportional_share_utility_eq (pool : ℝ → ℝ) (c : ℝ) (mine others : List ℝ) :
    procurement_agent_utility proportional_share_alloc (proportional_share_pay pool) c mine
        others =
      mine.sum / (mine.sum + others.sum) * (pool (mine.sum + others.sum) - c)
Source
step towards exists_sybil_proof_ex_post_safe_non_winner_take_all_procurement (Sybil-proof, ex-post safe procurement with non-winner-take-all equilibria, the open question of arXiv:2603.27779 v1, Sec. 6)
Verified
06 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 4
  • procurement_agent_utilityThe utility of an agent with cost c who submits the bids mine (one per identity) while all other identities bid others: the sum over…
  • proportional_share_allocProportional-share allocation: identity j receives the fraction b_j / W of the work, W being the total bid.
  • proportional_share_payProportional-share payment with total pool pool(W): identity j is paid its work share times pool(W).
  • sum_range_getD_appendSumming the first |mine| entries of mine ++ others gives the sum of mine.
Used by 6
  • proportional_share_no_pne_of_safe_all_costsIf a proportional-share mechanism is ex-post safe for every nonnegative cost, then no profile with at least one agent and nonnegative…
  • proportional_share_sybil_proofEvery proportional-share mechanism is Sybil-proof: a single bid equal to the sum of an agent's bids gives the same utility.
  • stake_share_pne_existsFor n >= 2 agents with costs in [0, L], if K M >= 3 n^2 L then the stake-share mechanism has a pure Nash equilibrium (each agent…
  • stake_share_pne_non_winner_take_allIn the stake-share mechanism with K, M > 0 and all costs at most L, every pure Nash equilibrium (with at least one agent) gives positive…
  • stake_share_two_agent_pneWith pool 1 + max(0, 2 - W) and costs 1/5 and 9/10, the stakes 24/35 and 18/35 form a pure Nash equilibrium.
  • stake_share_ex_post_safeWith K > 0 and M > 0, the stake-share mechanism is ex-post safe for every agent whose cost is at most L.

Lean source view module on GitHub

lemma proportional_share_utility_eq (pool : ℝ → ℝ) (c : ℝ) (mine others : List ℝ) :    procurement_agent_utility proportional_share_alloc (proportional_share_pay pool) c mine        others =      mine.sum / (mine.sum + others.sum) * (pool (mine.sum + others.sum) - c) := by  unfold procurement_agent_utility proportional_share_pay proportional_share_alloc  have : ∀ j, (mine ++ others).getD j 0 / (mine ++ others).sum * pool (mine ++ others).sum -      c * ((mine ++ others).getD j 0 / (mine ++ others).sum) =      (mine ++ others).getD j 0 * ((pool (mine ++ others).sum - c) / (mine ++ others).sum) := by    intro j; ring  simp_rw [this]  rw [← Finset.sum_mul, sum_range_getD_append, List.sum_append]  ring
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