Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice_le_bid_of_allocation_eq_some
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
When the item is sold, the clearing price is no more than the allocated bidder's bid.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in omit [AddCommGroup U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in lemma Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice_le_bid_of_allocation_eq_some {reserve : U} {b : I → U} {i : I} (halloc : allocation reserve b = some i) : clearingPrice reserve b ≤ b i
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice_le_bid_of_allocation_eq_some`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice_le_bid_of_allocation_eq_some← Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice_le_bid_of_allocation_eq_some (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/ReserveVickrey.lean:153): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 7
- Auction.SecondPrice.secondPrice_le_bid_winnerThe winner's bid is at least the second price.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.allocationThe item is sold exactly when the winning bid meets the reserve.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.reserve_le_bid_winner_of_allocation_eq_someIf the item is allocated, then the winning bid meets the reserve.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPriceThe price paid by the winner: the maximum of the reserve and the second price.
- Auction.SecondPrice.secondPriceThe second price: the highest bid among all bidders other than the winner.
- Auction.SecondPrice.winnerThe winner of the second-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses
Auction.argmaxBidfrom… - Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.winner_eq_of_allocation_eq_someIf bidder
iis allocated the item, theniis the second-price winner.
- Used by 2
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_nonnegTruthful bidding yields nonnegative utility.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_payment_le_bid_of_allocation_eq_someThe allocated bidder never pays more than her reported bid.
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] invariable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] inomit [AddCommGroup U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in/-- When the item is sold, the clearing price is no more than the allocated bidder's bid. -/lemma Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice_le_bid_of_allocation_eq_some {reserve : U} {b : I → U} {i : I} (halloc : allocation reserve b = some i) : clearingPrice reserve b ≤ b i := by have hwinner : SecondPrice.winner b = i := winner_eq_of_allocation_eq_some halloc have hreserve : reserve ≤ b i := by have h := reserve_le_bid_winner_of_allocation_eq_some halloc simpa [hwinner] using h have hsecond : SecondPrice.secondPrice b ≤ b i := by simpa [hwinner] using SecondPrice.secondPrice_le_bid_winner (b := b) exact max_le hreserve hsecond