AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice_le_bid_of_allocation_eq_some

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

When the item is sold, the clearing price is no more than the allocated bidder's bid.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in
variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in
omit [AddCommGroup U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in
lemma Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice_le_bid_of_allocation_eq_some {reserve : U} {b : I → U} {i : I}
    (halloc : allocation reserve b = some i) :
    clearingPrice reserve b ≤ b i
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice_le_bid_of_allocation_eq_some`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 7
Used by 2

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] invariable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] inomit [AddCommGroup U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in/-- When the item is sold, the clearing price is no more than the allocated bidder's bid. -/lemma Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice_le_bid_of_allocation_eq_some {reserve : U} {b : I → U} {i : I}    (halloc : allocation reserve b = some i) :    clearingPrice reserve b ≤ b i := by  have hwinner : SecondPrice.winner b = i := winner_eq_of_allocation_eq_some halloc  have hreserve : reserve ≤ b i := by    have h := reserve_le_bid_winner_of_allocation_eq_some halloc    simpa [hwinner] using h  have hsecond : SecondPrice.secondPrice b ≤ b i := by    simpa [hwinner] using SecondPrice.secondPrice_le_bid_winner (b := b)  exact max_le hreserve hsecond
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