Auction.SecondPrice.utility
defimported Lean
Utility of bidder i in a second-price auction: winner gets v i − secondPrice b, losers get 0.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in noncomputable def Auction.SecondPrice.utility (v b : I → U) (i : I) : U
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `Auction.SecondPrice.utility`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.SecondPrice.utility← Auction.SecondPrice.utility (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Vickrey.lean:113): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- Auction.SecondPrice.secondPriceThe second price: the highest bid among all bidders other than the winner.
- Auction.SecondPrice.winnerThe winner of the second-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses
Auction.argmaxBidfrom…
- Used by 5
- Auction.SecondPrice.valuation_is_dominantVickrey's Theorem (core form): Truthful bidding dominates any other bid. For any bid profile
b, replacingi's bid withv idoes… - Auction.SecondPrice.gameSecond-price auction as a strategic game. This is also the game induced by
mechanismviaMechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame; see… - Auction.SecondPrice.utility_winnerIf
iis the winner, utility isv i − secondPrice b. - Auction.SecondPrice.utility_nonnegTruthful bidding yields nonneg utility.
- Auction.SecondPrice.utility_loserIf
iis not the winner, utility is0.
- Auction.SecondPrice.valuation_is_dominantVickrey's Theorem (core form): Truthful bidding dominates any other bid. For any bid profile
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in /-- Utility of bidder `i` in a second-price auction: winner gets `v i − secondPrice b`, losers get `0`. -/ noncomputable def Auction.SecondPrice.utility (v b : I → U) (i : I) : U := if i = winner b then v i - secondPrice b else 0