Auction.SecondPrice.utility_nonneg
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Truthful bidding yields nonneg utility.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in variable {v : I → U} in lemma Auction.SecondPrice.utility_nonneg {b : I → U} {i : I} (htruth : b i = v i) : 0 ≤ utility v b i
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `Auction.SecondPrice.utility_nonneg`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.SecondPrice.utility_nonneg← Auction.SecondPrice.utility_nonneg (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Vickrey.lean:129): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 6
- Auction.SecondPrice.secondPrice_le_bid_winnerThe winner's bid is at least the second price.
- Auction.SecondPrice.utility_winnerIf
iis the winner, utility isv i − secondPrice b. - Auction.SecondPrice.secondPriceThe second price: the highest bid among all bidders other than the winner.
- Auction.SecondPrice.utility_loserIf
iis not the winner, utility is0. - Auction.SecondPrice.winnerThe winner of the second-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses
Auction.argmaxBidfrom… - Auction.SecondPrice.utilityUtility of bidder
iin a second-price auction: winner getsv i − secondPrice b, losers get0.
- Used by 1
- Auction.SecondPrice.valuation_is_dominantVickrey's Theorem (core form): Truthful bidding dominates any other bid. For any bid profile
b, replacingi's bid withv idoes…
- Auction.SecondPrice.valuation_is_dominantVickrey's Theorem (core form): Truthful bidding dominates any other bid. For any bid profile
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] invariable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] invariable {v : I → U} in/-- Truthful bidding yields nonneg utility. -/lemma Auction.SecondPrice.utility_nonneg {b : I → U} {i : I} (htruth : b i = v i) : 0 ≤ utility v b i := by rcases eq_or_ne i (winner b) with rfl | hne · rw [utility_winner rfl, sub_nonneg, ← htruth] exact secondPrice_le_bid_winner b · simp [utility_loser hne]