Auction.SecondPrice.utility_loser
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
If i is not the winner, utility is 0.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in variable {v : I → U} in omit [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in lemma Auction.SecondPrice.utility_loser {b : I → U} {i : I} (h : i ≠ winner b) : utility v b i = 0
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `Auction.SecondPrice.utility_loser`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.SecondPrice.utility_loser← Auction.SecondPrice.utility_loser (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Vickrey.lean:125): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 3
- Auction.SecondPrice.secondPriceThe second price: the highest bid among all bidders other than the winner.
- Auction.SecondPrice.winnerThe winner of the second-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses
Auction.argmaxBidfrom… - Auction.SecondPrice.utilityUtility of bidder
iin a second-price auction: winner getsv i − secondPrice b, losers get0.
- Used by 2
- Auction.SecondPrice.valuation_is_dominantVickrey's Theorem (core form): Truthful bidding dominates any other bid. For any bid profile
b, replacingi's bid withv idoes… - Auction.SecondPrice.utility_nonnegTruthful bidding yields nonneg utility.
- Auction.SecondPrice.valuation_is_dominantVickrey's Theorem (core form): Truthful bidding dominates any other bid. For any bid profile
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in variable {v : I → U} in omit [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in /-- If `i` is not the winner, utility is `0`. -/ lemma Auction.SecondPrice.utility_loser {b : I → U} {i : I} (h : i ≠ winner b) : utility v b i = 0 := if_neg h