BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport_of_isZeroNormalized_of_hasInterimEnvelopeFormula
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Under the interim envelope formula and nonnegative envelope increments, zero normalization implies support-restricted interim IR.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport_of_isZeroNormalized_of_hasInterimEnvelopeFormula [DecidableEq I] (B : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hzero : B.IsZeroNormalized) (henv : B.HasInterimEnvelopeFormula) (hint_nonneg : B.HasNonnegativeInterimAllocationIntegralOnSupport) : B.IsIndividuallyRationalOnSupport
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport_of_isZeroNormalized_of_hasInterimEnvelopeFormula`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport_of_isZeroNormalized_of_hasInterimEnvelopeFormula← BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport_of_isZeroNormalized_of_hasInterimEnvelopeFormula (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/OptimalSingleItem.lean:1088): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 30
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsZeroNormalizedZero normalization for a Bayesian single-item auction's payment rule: reporting
0gives payment0, holding the other reports fixed. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasNonnegativeInterimAllocationIntegralOnSupportNonnegative envelope increments on
[0, ωᵢ]. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanismBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanism
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIndividuallyRationalOnSupportInterim individual rationality on
[0, ωᵢ]. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport_iff_interimExpectedPayment_zero_nonpos[MSZ 12.52] Supportwise IR iff zero-type payment is nonpositive.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasInterimEnvelopeFormula[MSZ 12.49] Payoff envelope.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_zero_of_isZeroNormalizedA zero-normalized payment rule has zero interim expected payment at type
0. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_priorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_prior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeDataBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeData
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPaymentInterim expected payment
m_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsZeroNormalizedZero normalization for a Bayesian single-item auction's payment rule: reporting
- Used by 1
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen scoped BigOperators inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} in/-- Under the interim envelope formula and nonnegative envelope increments, zero normalization implies support-restricted interim IR. -/theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport_of_isZeroNormalized_of_hasInterimEnvelopeFormula [DecidableEq I] (B : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hzero : B.IsZeroNormalized) (henv : B.HasInterimEnvelopeFormula) (hint_nonneg : B.HasNonnegativeInterimAllocationIntegralOnSupport) : B.IsIndividuallyRationalOnSupport := by exact (B.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport_iff_interimExpectedPayment_zero_nonpos henv hint_nonneg).2 (fun i => by rw [B.interimExpectedPayment_zero_of_isZeroNormalized hzero i])