BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport_iff_interimExpectedPayment_zero_nonpos
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
[MSZ 12.52] Supportwise IR iff zero-type payment is nonpositive.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport_iff_interimExpectedPayment_zero_nonpos (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (henv : A.HasInterimEnvelopeFormula) (hint_nonneg : A.HasNonnegativeInterimAllocationIntegralOnSupport) : A.IsIndividuallyRationalOnSupport ↔ ∀ i : I, A.interimExpectedPayment i 0 ≤ 0
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport_iff_interimExpectedPayment_zero_nonpos`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport_iff_interimExpectedPayment_zero_nonpos← BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport_iff_interimExpectedPayment_zero_nonpos (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/BayesianSingleItem.lean:1487): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 23
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasNonnegativeInterimAllocationIntegralOnSupportNonnegative envelope increments on
[0, ωᵢ]. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIndividuallyRationalOnSupportInterim individual rationality on
[0, ωᵢ]. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoffTruthful interim payoff
U_i(t_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProbInterim allocation probability
q_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasInterimEnvelopeFormula[MSZ 12.49] Payoff envelope.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityInterim utility
q_i(z_i) * t_i - m_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPaymentInterim expected payment
m_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- TypeCDFA scalar type distribution on the interval
[0, ω], recorded by its CDF. - ContinuousTypeProfileAgent-specific continuous private-value data.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasNonnegativeInterimAllocationIntegralOnSupportNonnegative envelope increments on
- Used by 1
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport_of_isZeroNormalized_of_hasInterimEnvelopeFormulaUnder the interim envelope formula and nonnegative envelope increments, zero normalization implies support-restricted interim IR.
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} in/-- [MSZ 12.52] Supportwise IR iff zero-type payment is nonpositive. -/theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport_iff_interimExpectedPayment_zero_nonpos (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (henv : A.HasInterimEnvelopeFormula) (hint_nonneg : A.HasNonnegativeInterimAllocationIntegralOnSupport) : A.IsIndividuallyRationalOnSupport ↔ ∀ i : I, A.interimExpectedPayment i 0 ≤ 0 := by constructor · intro hIR i have hW0 : 0 ≤ A.equilibriumPayoff i 0 := hIR i 0 le_rfl (A.typeData.cdf i).omega_nonneg rw [equilibriumPayoff, interimQuasiLinearUtility] at hW0 linarith · intro hM0 i v_i hv_nonneg hv_le have hW0 : 0 ≤ A.equilibriumPayoff i 0 := by rw [equilibriumPayoff, interimQuasiLinearUtility] have hM := hM0 i linarith have hint : 0 ≤ ∫ z in 0..v_i, A.interimAllocProb i z := hint_nonneg i v_i hv_nonneg hv_le have hsum : 0 ≤ A.equilibriumPayoff i 0 + ∫ z in 0..v_i, A.interimAllocProb i z := add_nonneg hW0 hint simpa [henv i v_i] using hsum