BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_mono_of_isIncentiveCompatible
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
IC implies monotonicity of q_i.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_mono_of_isIncentiveCompatible (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hIC : A.IsIncentiveCompatible) (i : I) : Monotone (A.interimAllocProb i)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_mono_of_isIncentiveCompatible`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_mono_of_isIncentiveCompatible← BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_mono_of_isIncentiveCompatible (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/BayesianSingleItem.lean:1137): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 18
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoffTruthful interim payoff
U_i(t_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProbInterim allocation probability
q_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIncentiveCompatibleInterim incentive compatibility.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIncentiveCompatible_iff_equilibriumPayoff_ge[MSZ 12.48] IC iff the one-dimensional payoff inequality.
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoffTruthful interim payoff
- Used by 1
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasIntervalIntegrableInterimAllocation_of_isIncentiveCompatibleIC gives global interval integrability of
q_i.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasIntervalIntegrableInterimAllocation_of_isIncentiveCompatibleIC gives global interval integrability of
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} in/-- IC implies monotonicity of `q_i`. -/theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_mono_of_isIncentiveCompatible (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hIC : A.IsIncentiveCompatible) (i : I) : Monotone (A.interimAllocProb i) := by rw [Monotone] intro x y hxy by_cases hlt : x < y · have hineq := (A.isIncentiveCompatible_iff_equilibriumPayoff_ge.mp hIC) have h1 : A.equilibriumPayoff i x + A.interimAllocProb i x * (y - x) ≤ A.equilibriumPayoff i y := by exact hineq i y x have h2 : A.equilibriumPayoff i y + A.interimAllocProb i y * (x - y) ≤ A.equilibriumPayoff i x := by exact hineq i x y have hprod : (A.interimAllocProb i x - A.interimAllocProb i y) * (y - x) ≤ 0 := by nlinarith have hpos : 0 < y - x := sub_pos.mpr hlt nlinarith · have hEq : x = y := le_antisymm hxy (le_of_not_gt hlt) simp [hEq]