BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIncentiveCompatible_iff_equilibriumPayoff_ge
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
[MSZ 12.48] IC iff the one-dimensional payoff inequality.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIncentiveCompatible_iff_equilibriumPayoff_ge (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) : A.IsIncentiveCompatible ↔ ∀ (i : I) (v_i x_i : ℝ), A.equilibriumPayoff i v_i ≥ A.equilibriumPayoff i x_i + A.interimAllocProb i x_i * (v_i - x_i)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIncentiveCompatible_iff_equilibriumPayoff_ge`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIncentiveCompatible_iff_equilibriumPayoff_ge← BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIncentiveCompatible_iff_equilibriumPayoff_ge (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/BayesianSingleItem.lean:1124): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 19
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoffTruthful interim payoff
U_i(t_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtility_eq_equilibriumPayoff_addMisreport utility in terms of truthful payoff at the report.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProbInterim allocation probability
q_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityInterim utility
q_i(z_i) * t_i - m_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIncentiveCompatibleInterim incentive compatibility.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoffTruthful interim payoff
- Used by 3
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_mono_of_isIncentiveCompatibleIC implies monotonicity of
q_i. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.deriv_equilibriumPayoff_eq_interimAllocProb_of_isIncentiveCompatibleAt differentiable types,
U_i' = q_i. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoff_convexOn_of_isIncentiveCompatibleIC makes truthful payoff convex.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_mono_of_isIncentiveCompatibleIC implies monotonicity of
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} in/-- [MSZ 12.48] IC iff the one-dimensional payoff inequality. -/theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIncentiveCompatible_iff_equilibriumPayoff_ge (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) : A.IsIncentiveCompatible ↔ ∀ (i : I) (v_i x_i : ℝ), A.equilibriumPayoff i v_i ≥ A.equilibriumPayoff i x_i + A.interimAllocProb i x_i * (v_i - x_i) := by constructor · intro hIC i v_i x_i simpa [interimQuasiLinearUtility_eq_equilibriumPayoff_add] using hIC i v_i x_i · intro hineq i t_i z_i simpa [interimQuasiLinearUtility_eq_equilibriumPayoff_add] using hineq i t_i z_i