EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.isRationalizable
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Nash strategies are rationalizable.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.isRationalizable {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} {σ : G.Profile} (hN : IsNashEquilibrium G σ) (i : N) : G.IsRationalizable i (σ i)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.isRationalizable`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.isRationalizable← StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.isRationalizable (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/IESDS.lean:82): adapted
What was changed in
EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.isRationalizable--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/IESDS.lean:82 (StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.isRationalizable) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,3 +1,7 @@ -/-- Nash strategies are rationalizable. -/ -theorem IsNashEquilibrium.isRationalizable {G : StrategicGame N U} +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in +variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in +open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in +theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.isRationalizable {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} {σ : G.Profile} (hN : IsNashEquilibrium G σ) (i : N) : - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 8
- IsNashEquilibriumA profile
σis a pure Nash equilibrium of gameGif every player is playing a best response: no player can profitably deviate. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.survivesNash equilibrium strategies survive all rounds. [MSZ 4.31]
- EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
G: each player picks a strategy. This is a dependent function∀ i, G.strategy i. The profile… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsRationalizableA strategy is rationalizable if it survives all rounds.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- IsNashEquilibriumA profile
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in /-- Nash strategies are rationalizable. -/ theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.isRationalizable {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} {σ : G.Profile} (hN : IsNashEquilibrium G σ) (i : N) : G.IsRationalizable i (σ i) := fun n => hN.survives n i