IsNashEquilibrium.of_dominant
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
T3: If every player has a weakly dominant strategy and σ assigns each player their dominant strategy, then σ is a Nash equilibrium.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in theorem IsNashEquilibrium.of_dominant {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} {σ : G.Profile} (h : ∀ i : N, IsWeaklyDominant G i (σ i)) : IsNashEquilibrium G σ
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `IsNashEquilibrium.of_dominant`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.IsNashEquilibrium.of_dominant← IsNashEquilibrium.of_dominant (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/NashEquilibrium.lean:35): adapted
What was changed in
IsNashEquilibrium.of_dominant--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/NashEquilibrium.lean:35 (IsNashEquilibrium.of_dominant) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,4 +1,6 @@ -/-- T3: If every player has a weakly dominant strategy and `σ` assigns each player - their dominant strategy, then `σ` is a Nash equilibrium. -/ -theorem of_dominant {G : StrategicGame N U} {σ : G.Profile} +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in +open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in +theorem IsNashEquilibrium.of_dominant {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} {σ : G.Profile} (h : ∀ i : N, IsWeaklyDominant G i (σ i)) : IsNashEquilibrium G σ := - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 8
- IsWeaklyDominant.isBestResponseT2: A weakly dominant strategy is a best response to any profile where player
iplays it. - IsNashEquilibriumA profile
σis a pure Nash equilibrium of gameGif every player is playing a best response: no player can profitably deviate. - IsWeaklyDominantStrategy
sis weakly dominant for playeri. - EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
G: each player picks a strategy. This is a dependent function∀ i, G.strategy i. The profile… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- IsWeaklyDominant.isBestResponseT2: A weakly dominant strategy is a best response to any profile where player
- Used by 1
- Mechanism.IsDSIC.truthful_isNashIf a mechanism is DSIC, then truthful reporting is a Nash equilibrium.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Preorder U] in open EconCSLib.StrategicGame in /-- T3: If every player has a weakly dominant strategy and `σ` assigns each player their dominant strategy, then `σ` is a Nash equilibrium. -/ theorem IsNashEquilibrium.of_dominant {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} {σ : G.Profile} (h : ∀ i : N, IsWeaklyDominant G i (σ i)) : IsNashEquilibrium G σ := fun i => (h i).isBestResponse σ rfl